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One year after the Kosovo war the future of the Balkans seems more opaque and 
uncertain than it was a year ago. The war could not succeed in replacing successfully 
diplomacy and failed to fulfill its main purposes, both in breaking off ethnic cleansing 
in Kosovo and in bringing lasting peace and stability on the Balkans. The 
international community could not effectively fill the political, security, 
administrative and economic vacuum in Kosovo after the end of the hot phase of the 
crisis. Even more, the two main factors in the conflict - the Yugoslav military and 
police forces and the Albanian extremist structures - pointed out by the West as the 
major sources of instability, were not significantly weakened. Neither NATO attacks, 
nor the international blockade imposed on Yugoslavia, nor the consequent damages 
were enough to shaken the power of the Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic. On 
the contrary, while the political opposition in Serbia has proved its inefficiency, he 
retains strong control on the security forces, military commands, and an effective 
media machine. At the same time, NATO’s peacekeeping mission in Kosovo is losing 
control and the international administration is failing to effectively administer the 
province. During the last one year, the Kosovo Liberation Army was not disbanded, 
nor it was demilitarized. De facto, KLA maintained strong hold on power and 
undertook a revenge campaign of violation and ethnic cleansing in full view of the 
international forces. As a result, the idea of multiethnic Kosovo as well as the 
prospects of people of different ethnicity and religion living together seem more 
unrealistic than a year ago. 
The changes that have taken place on the Balkans following the end of the Kosovo 
crisis and the security vacuum that has resulted from it have required a new type of 
relationships and interstate behavior as well as a new regional security system, which 
could provide for stabilization of the security situation in the region. Disrespecting the 
strong interdependence at the regional level and underestimating the correlation 
between internal conflicts and their regional dimension, the West has applied a rather 
isolationist approach. In contradiction to the idea of their initially proclaimed 
purposes, the Western countries have established a “cordon sanitaire” around Serbia. 
Thus, they have made pointless any idea for multilateral confidence and stability-
building measures at the regional level leaving aside the state, which lies at the heart 
of the Balkans and where there is a major risk of destabilization. 
DISCREPANCY BETWEEN PURPOSE AND EFFECTS. 
 
THE PURPOSE. 
A year ago NATO countries began a military campaign against the regime in 
Belgrade coalescing politically around a set of purposes. The primary purpose, which 
was pointed out was the defense of the human rights principles - stopping the ethnic 
cleansing of Kosovar Albanians, resolving the existing humanitarian problem and 
enabling refugees to go home. But there was also a maximal purpose, based on the 
“security through integration and cooperation” formula, which includes as follows: 
• strengthening the process of regional cooperation and integration as a 
significant contributing factor to stability and security in Europe - 
development of an institutional system of regional cooperation in the fields of 
economy, reconstruction, security, education and media, civil society and 
democratization.  
• integrating the whole of South-East Europe into the structures of the European 
union  
• establishing regional security structures which will be further integrated into 
the common European security architecture.  
Intensification of the regional military-political cooperation, development of mutual 
initiatives for increasing trust and commitment to solving problems of common 
concern, creation of regional sources of security and transformation of the Balkan 
countries from objects into subjects of their own security were seen by the 
international community as the key principles of the organization of a new security 
system for South-Eastern Europe which would bring peace and stability to the entire 
region. 
 
THE EFFECTS. 
Institutional effects. De jure Yugoslavia has a relatively well developed institutional 
system endorsed by its constitution. During the last ten years, however, the Yugoslav 
President Slobodan Milosevic has imposed a de facto authoritarian regime dominated 
by nationalistic values. He has succeeded in transforming nationalism into a tool for 
inner-state consolidation and into one of the ways to improve own positions in the 
process of resolving the problems with neighboring countries1.  
There was a strong believe that the NATO military operation against Yugoslavia 
could seriously shaken the authoritarian regime and Slobodan Milosevic’s hold on 
power who is seen by the Western countries as the main hindrance to the 
democratization of Serbia. However, the expected political unrest and transformation 
from authoritarian rule to democracy did not happen. On the contrary, further 
disrespect for the law system and the international democratic principles as a whole 
appeared. The political stage in FR Yugoslavia is still dominated by Milosevic who 
retains control not only of the security forces and military commands but also of the 
financial flows and an effective media machine. Being a “good guy” and partner of 
the West (together with the Croatia’s president Franjo Tudjman and the leader of the 
Bosnian Muslims Alija Izetbegovic, who is now chairman of Bosnia’s Tripartite 
Presidency) concerning the post-Yugoslavia crisis management, now Milosevic is 
given the reversed role - he was proclaimed a war criminal and an enemy of the 
international community. Driven into a corner, he has no other option but to stabilize 
his positions and consolidate his power. And he will be willing to risk a lot in order to 
secure these objectives which makes him even more unpredictable and places him out 
of any control. 
The isolation and the international sanctions imposed by the international community 
on Serbia not only impede the process of internal political democratization but also 
strengthen the Serbia government’s unwillingness to compromise and its ability to 
rally the population against the outside world. The international embargo additionally 
increases the challenge the political opposition in Serbia is faced with. The latter has 
not yet developed a strategy to capitalize on public anger with Milosevic, neither a 
strategic plan for political changes in Serbia. Now, it is entering the tenth year of 
multipartism without any precise political and economic program to be elaborated. 
The last year’s conflict in Kosovo has also deepened the tension and confrontations 
between the two components of the Yugoslav federation, further loosing the ties 
between them. Montenegro, the smaller unit in the federation, has de facto achieved 
full economic and, to great extent, political independence. Federal financial and 
customs laws, as well as the jurisdiction of the National Bank of Yugoslavia have 
been effectively suspended on the territory of Montenegro and customs barriers have 
been erected between the republics. Besides, Montenegro has passed its own Law on 
Citizenship and is already establishing its own foreign policy, abolishing visas for 
foreigners contrary to the will of the federal administration. Independently, 
Montenegrin authorities have increased the potential of the republic’s security forces 
and now the republic has about 10,000 to 15,000 security forces staff2. 
As a response to the Montenegrin reforms, the Yugoslav authorities have taken 
countermeasures, as a result of which the Yugoslav Army has remained the only one 
common federal institution that still act on the territory of the both republics within 
the framework of the Yugoslav federation. These countermeasures include as follows:  
• creation of paramilitary formations from within the ranks of the Yugoslav 
Army (Voiska Jugoslava, VJ) in Montenegro that owe allegiance only to 
Belgrade;  
• suspension of all dinar payments between Montanegro and Serbia;  
• ban on the import and export of goods between the two republics within the 
Yugoslav federation;  
• ban on the Montenegrin export to third countries, etc.  
Kosovo. As a result of the destructive military operation and the large scale ethnic 
cleansing, the traditional political and administrative system of the Kosovo region has 
been disintegrated. During June and July 1999 international military and civilian 
organizations entered Kosovo aiming at providing all forms of government while 
preparing the people of the province to take over the responsibility. One year later, 
UNMIK, the international administration, which in compliance with UN Resolution 
1244 was charged with establishing some kind of workable administration within 
Kosovo, has achieved little success. Although, there is small progress in building 
some basic civil institutions, a domestic judicial system and local governance, the key 
problem of organizing a stable and democratic multiethnic society remains. 
The main obstacle for the international administration effectiveness has been the 
political explosive question of the future status of Kosovo, which is still subject of 
antagonistic interpretations. Keen to avoid the Kosovo status issue, the international 
community has postponed the matter of a central Kosovo political administration. So, 
UNMIK’s biggest challenge has turned to be the establishment of a kind of an 
effective decision-making system necessary for the resolution of the accumulated 
legal, administrative and security problems. The established Transitional 
Administrative Council of Kosovo, which has to act as a collective head of 
government, has turned out to be not a working mechanism. The Kosovo Serbs have 
not accepted the agreement and even the last decision of some of the Kosovo Serbs 
leaders to participate in it as observers has met the resistance of a significant part of 
the Serbs in the province. According to them, any participation in the work of such 
provisional institutions before Serbs refugees return is not of interest to Serbs, as this 
would freeze the status quo. The Kosovo Albanians have used this vacuum to 
institutionalize KLA in power and strengthen its position as the preeminent political 
force in Kosovo. It has succeeded in establishing a strong domination on the civil 
administration of the province and has turned to be de facto its government. 
The absence of a clear legal framework has also been a result of the confusions over 
the future status of Kosovo. The Albanians judges do not want to apply the Yugoslav 
laws valid in the province until the start of the NATO campaign arguing that they are 
discriminatory. As a result, pre-1989 laws are applied - that is the law system that 
existed before the suspension of the Kosovo autonomy. Just because of the legal 
anarchy, the fragile judicial system as well as the wrong policy of the international 
community, power in the province is now held not by pluralistic and democratic 
structures but by private power structures and mafia organizations interested in the 
preservation of the chaos and lack of effective authority. Despite the regulations of the 
UN Resolution 1244 - it is enacted that wider Kosovo autonomy be created within the 
framework of Serbia - as well as the reservations of most of the countries, the 
Yugoslav sovereignty is effectively being suspended. Although, the Special 
Representative of the UN Secretary General, Bernard Kouchner has declared that he 
does not have a mandate to create an independent Kosovo, the process of 
disentangling Kosovo’s administration as well as its economy from Yugoslav 
jurisdiction continues to move the province towards self-governing state entity. 
The implementation of the UN Resolution has been additionally hampered because of 
the shortages in the administration’s annual budget. Bernard Kouchner, has openly 
complained that UNMIK is understaffed and lacks the necessary funds to administer 
Kosovo property. Only 3,000 of the promised 6,000 international police officers are 
currently on duty in the province and only about half of the $2.2 billion in foreign aid 
has been delivered 3. 
Economic effects. 
The ethnic conflicts and inter-communal wars in former Yugoslavia have dramatically 
reduced the relatively high performance of the former Yugoslav economy and living 
standards of the people. As a result of the last NATO campaign against Serbia, the 
country’s heavy and light industries, agriculture, and infrastructure have suffered huge 
damages that have provoked a deep economic crisis. Instead of humanitarian 
assistance and considerable international economic and financial support, which 
Yugoslavia eagerly needed, the country has received new embargo and new 
international sanctions. Serbia has remained isolated and has not been permitted to 
open up its economic system to the world. There has been no legal basis for any flow 
of capital, for trade in goods and services. In that situation, the country has chosen the 
only way it possesses to defend and develop its economy, its home and foreign trade - 
it has withdrawn resources from the legal sector to the gray sector of transactions, 
which has led to complete criminalization of the state’s economy as well as of the 
region as a whole. 
Unlike its isolationist policy towards Serbia, the international community has applied 
a different approach related to Kosovo, directly involving in the reconstruction of the 
province. But one year after the military campaign of NATO a lot of fundamental 
problems still remain unresolved. There still are not any serious results in reviving 
economic activities, in providing any Kosovo administration revenue and in lessening 
strong dependence on foreign aid. There is no significant progress in the rebuilding of 
the economic and service infrastructure. Although the UN administration has 
implemented a number of measures, such as introducing the German mark as the 
official currency and establishing customs and import duties, it is estimated that till 
now humanitarian projects have failed to meet even 10% of the need. 
Given the international community’s difficulties in restructuring the province, in 
controlling the situation, and in preventing the rise of organized crime, it is not 
surprisingly that the regional economic activities are completely dominated by 
powerful Albanian clan Mafia structures, which gradually turn the region into an 
entirely criminal area. Without an effective law and order system, and enjoying the 
tacit support of the international forces those groups that are closely related to KLA 
are gaining strength and threaten to destabilize the security situation in the Balkan 
region. 
Security effects. 
NATO operation against Yugoslavia has not succeeded in establishing a stable peace 
and security on the Balkans neither in creating an integrated approach to regional 
security mostly because it has failed to break down the two major sources of 
instability and tension in the region. These are the Yugoslav military and police forces 
and the Albanian extremist elements. 
Yugoslav military and police forces. Despite Serbia’s political, economic and military 
weakness following the last two wars in Bosnia and Kosovo, the Yugoslav Army is 
still a significant security factor at the regional level. Yugoslav President retains 
control of security forces and is still strongly supported by the Yugoslav Army 
(Voiska Jugoslava, VJ). It is led by loyal to Milosevic hard-line generals who 
continue to obey only him and his decisions, disrespecting the Federal Supreme 
Defense Council. For the time being, there are no clear signals that the status quo 
could be changed and that the dissatisfaction among the lower ranks could grow up in 
a way that the army to turn against the regime. On the contrary, the appointment of 
Gen. Dragoljub Ojdanic (who is among the top political figures indicted for war 
crimes by the tribunal in The Hague along with Milosevic) as federal defense minister 
and of Nebojsa Pavkovic (who is one of the ideologues of the war with NATO) as 
Chief of the General Staff could lead to the further deterioration of the situation in the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Besides, the largest item of 2000 year Yugoslavia’s 
budget was intended for financing the defense of the country and the Yugoslav 
Army’s expenses - 73 % of the $1.94 billion total; 25 % of Serbia’s 2000 budget was 
allocated for the Milosevic controlled police forces4. 
Having the authority with the military and police forces, Slobodan Milosevic could 
use some Balkan flashpoints to detract attention from serious domestic problems, on 
the one hand, and to challenge the Western countries and the regional security system 
that has been imposed by them, on the other hand. The developments in the northern 
Kosovo town of Mitrovica (the largest remaining minority “enclave”) have proved 
that NATO has not deprived Serbia to influence events in Kosovo and to destabilize 
the region. Yugoslav Army’s special operations and many training exercises near the 
Kosovo border, its ability to sustain the presence of federal forces in Montenegro as 
well as the occupation of the civilian areas of the Podgorica airport by army units 
could be estimated as such a signal from the Yugoslav President to the international 
community that he is still in command of sufficient military force which may turn the 
country and the whole region into a new battlefield. And, a new conflict means further 
destabilization and isolation of the whole region. It means that the Balkans will 
remain cut off from Europe, serving only as a cordon sanitaire around Yugoslavia and 
that the efforts for serious regional cooperation and security structures will be 
additionally hindered. 
The Albanian factor. In the aftermath of the Kosovo conflict Kosovo Liberation 
Army (KLA) has not been transformed nor it has been removed from the political 
scene in Kosovo. Its well-preserved remnants have in fact remained a powerful and 
active factor in the province. Part of the guerrillas have established a new political 
party, the Party of Democratic Progress of Kosovo, others have joined the new 
Kosovo Protection Corps (a kind of national guard for emergency and disaster 
response, which the Albanians intend at some future time to turn into a permanent 
army of an independent Kosovo) or Kosovo Police Service. There is, however, a 
significant part that is still involved into broad range of corrupt and illegal activities, 
including organized crime and violation. This group of former KLA members still 
threaten the future of Kosovo as well as of the neighboring states, especially those, 
where the Albanian Diaspora has established a strong presence. 
As the international forces suffer difficulties in controlling the security situation and 
in preventing the rise of organizes crime, they have not made any serious systematic 
efforts to confront and destroy all KLA structures. Supplying and supporting KLA 
forces during the conflict, in the post-crisis period NATO troops have not strongly 
opposed to them nor to their major aim - the establishment of an independent mono-
ethnic Kosovo. Holding positions of considerable power and enjoying easy access to 
weapons, most of the KLA members have completely disregarded international 
community’s mission for a peaceful and multiethnic Kosovo and have involved into 
violent and criminal activities. They undertook a new campaign of mass scale human 
rights violation where the roles were reversed. Ethnic cleansing and systematic abuse 
of human rights mainly over the Serb population but also over other ethnic 
communities (Roma, Turks, Goranci, etc) has taken place in the view of the KFOR 
units. According to official estimates, following the withdrawal of the Serbia forces 
about 350,000 non-Albanians left Kosovo, among them about 270,000 Serbs5. 
The international administration, having difficulty in meeting its target for number of 
international police, cannot succeed in confronting the present human rights abuses 
and in establishing a working cooperation with the different units of the KLA. Instead 
of adopting an effective method for protecting the ethnic minorities in the province, 
KFOR and UNMIK have opted to establish protected zones mostly for Serbs, which 
have turned to be merely crisis spots with a growing dissension between the two 
communities and radicalization of both sides (more than half of the Serb population 
live in north Mitrovica and the surrounding area, which means that there are only 
40,000 in all the rest of the province). KFOR has made little progress in establishing 
law and order and is gradually losing control in these special zones, becoming even 
target of Albanian violence. NATO has been placed into an embarrassing position of 
defending itself and its mission against those it basically went in to defend. The 
prolonged violence in Mitrovica have become a symbol of the helplessness of the 
international administration to pacify the resistance of both Serbs and Albanians, to 
force them to live together in harmony and have gradually undermined the mission of 
the international forces in Kosovo. The proposals for increased international presence 
in the province have additionally illustrated NATO’s incapacity to establish firm 
control of the extremists elements and to guarantee safety and security in the region. 
On the other side, the understaffed police forces, the lack of the necessary funds, the 
absence of a clear legal system as well as the influence and the strong presence of the 
cruel Albanian mafia have created a good climate for criminals and militant groups to 
prosper. Criminal organization has appeared, exploring the lack of security and police 
to attack property and people belonging to ethnic minority, to steal, harass and kill 
citizens across Kosovo. Crime, weapons and drug trafficking is flourishing in full 
view of international authorities. It is known that the so called “Balkan route” - a 
smuggling channel from Afghanistan via Bulgaria, Macedonia, Kosovo to Western 
Europe - that supplies 80 % of Europe’s heroin is dominated exactly by the Kosovo 
Albanians who rely on clan loyalties to tightly control the whole business6. 
International experts consider that the Kosovo drug smugglers “are handling up to 
five tons of heroin a month, more than twice the quantity they were trafficking before 
the war”7. The Balkan route is not only a way for them to make enormous profit but 
also a way to smuggling weapons in the Balkan region. 
Becoming increasingly secure in their authorities over Kosovo, the Albanian militants 
begin to struggle between each other for power - either political or criminal - and for 
control over those lucrative criminal activities. Gradually, the incidents of inter-ethnic 
violence are being “muffled” by rifts and battles between different KLA leaders and 
fractures. The international forces are not able or simply do not want to impose 
control over those organized crime elements nor do they risk to interfere into internal 
KLA struggles, which in addition stimulates the criminalization of Kosovo and 
shakens the security situation on the Balkans. 
While the main civilian bodies, the UN and the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, OSCE, keep on being subject to contradictions and disputes, 
the substantial security threats in the region - Yugoslav military structures and 
Albanian extremist elements - are gaining strength and emanate constant threat to 
seriously challenge peace and security in the region. Both the Yugoslav army and the 
Albanians have retained their potential of provoking and maintaining ethnic conflicts 
and for that reason they remain a enormous threat to the development and the peaceful 
reconstruction of the whole region. Any new confrontation between them could not 
only undermine the basic security in the province but could also spill out smuggling, 
crime and violence into the whole Balkan region destabilizing the fragile balance 
established within it. Any further confrontation in the region and creation of an 
independent Albanian Kosovo will mean destabilization, as it would encourage 
Albanians in the southern part of Serbia proper, in Macedonia, and in Montenegro to 
make similar demands. It would provoke a chain reaction of self-determination 
aspirations and bring about intensification of the existing contradictions between 
Macedonians and Albanians within Macedonia. The aggravation of the tension in 
Macedonia with its precarious ethnic balance will have an effect on Bulgaria, which 
maintain close relations with it. On the other side, an independent Kosovo could 
provoke a domino effects and strengthen the nationalist aspirations not only in 
Western Macedonia but also in Bosnia and in Sandzak - an area covering the north of 
Montenegro and south-west of Serbia. The ethnic Muslims are the largest ethnic 
group in Sandzak. They have strong family and other ties with the Bosnian Muslims 
and a possible secession of Kosovo could intensify the strivings for strengthened 
relations with Bosnia and even for breaking away from Serbia. The establishment of 
an independent Kosovo state could also undermine the fragile inter-ethnic tolerance 
between the different ethnic communities in Bosnia. It could make them destroy the 
Dayton accords and lead to destabilization of the Balkan region as a whole. Greece 
and Turkey, both NATO member state with important national interests on the 
Balkans, would also be affected and upset with such a development of the regional 
security situation. 
 
 
“CORDON SANITAIRE” AROUND FR YUGOSLAVIA - THE NEW 
REGIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM.  
 
The Kosovo crisis and its aftermath have brought about significant changes to the 
security environment on the Balkans which call for the development of a new security 
system for the region. The process of defining a new security system has been 
underlined basically by the idea that the Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic is the 
main obstacle for the achievement of the main purposes of the international 
community related to the region of South-East Europe. 
The West has already tried to overthrow Milosevic by using several means. First, it 
was the blockade imposed on Yugoslavia, then came the NATO attacks with the hope 
that popular discontent from the damages and the loss of Kosovo are enough to 
weaken his power. This did not happen, and after the hot phase of the conflict the 
Western countries has imposed a cordon sanitaire around Serbia. Both by political 
and economic measures, the West tries to strengthen the isolation of the republic, to 
tighten the noose around the regime in Belgrade, to limit the most destabilizing effects 
proceeding from it and finally to gain its major purpose - political, economic and 
military integration of the whole region. 
The Southeast European Stability Pact has also been designed in a way that suppose 
the establishment of a ring around Serbia, which would gradually reduce its strategic 
importance. The European Union member states has emphasized that only democratic 
and cooperative Serbia, living at peace with its neighbors, will be welcome to join the 
European family and will enjoy the funds necessary for the development and 
reconstruction of the country. Thus, instead of support and cooperation, the Western 
countries have chosen selective sanctions as the basic means for the achievement of 
their aims concerning the region. 
The establishment of the new security system has seriously affected Serbia’s pro-
Western oriented neighboring countries converting them into links of the ring called 
“cordon sanitaire”. After the death of its authoritarian president Franjo Tudjman and 
the peaceful transfer of power, Croatia has shown its strong pro-Western orientation 
and firm determination to meet the requirements necessary for EU integration. The 
divisions within Bosnia still exist and a possible withdrawal of the international 
administration could bring about chaos and a new stage of violence. Hungary is 
already a NATO member state and is in its way to join the European Union, while 
Bulgaria and Romania apply both for EU and NATO membership. Even 
Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania, despite their political and economic 
problems, have proved their pro-Western orientation and their will to cooperate with 
the Western countries. Playing the role of a “buffer zone” between Serbia and the 
Western countries, all neighboring countries are exposed to a double pressure both 
external and internal - on the one hand, they are exposed to the negative impact of 
Belgrade’s status, and on the other hand, to the threat of further turbulence within FR 
Yugoslavia. 
 
 
INTERNAL PRESSURE. 
 
During the last ten years Slobodan Milosevic has proved that the key element of his 
strategy for political survival is on the one hand, his ability to provoke and direct the 
nationalist sentiments of the Serb population, and on the other hand, his ability to spill 
out crisis distracting the public attention from the domestic political situation. The 
latter is extremely important for the neighbors of a country which is in full isolation 
and under international sanctions. 
Faced with a total isolation, the Yugoslav President has no other way to respond to the 
impending threat but to “export” the internal tensions and to internationalize the 
crisis. If he does not succeed in spreading the crisis beyond the borders of Yugoslavia, 
it would burst within the framework of the country and would oust him from power. 
On the contrary, the extension of the conflict area and the spilling over of the tensions 
into zones outside the country’s territory would immediately relieve domestic 
pressure and increase leader’s possibility to strengthen his grip on power and to 
successfully manage the situation in his country. In this case, the conflict will be 
transferred to the territory of the neighboring state, especially to those, where the 
same conflict premise does exist. Which are these countries? On the first place, these 
are Macedonia and Montenegro because of the significant number of Albanians living 
within their framework. In Macedonia the Albanians constitute one third of the 
Macedonian population, while in Montenegro they are about one sixth of the 
population. Sandzak and Bosnia will also be among the most threatened areas because 
of their predominant Muslim population. In Sandjak, which borders Kosovo, Albania, 
and Bosnia and which is a strategic passage to the Adriatic, the Muslim are claiming 
territorial and political autonomy. The Bosnian Serb factor must also be taken into 
account because of the fragility of the peace in Bosnia and because of the still existing 
strategy of rapprochement with the “motherland”. 
Refugee problems, which will inevitably emerge with the spread of the conflict will 
additionally destabilize the security situation in the neighboring countries and can 
lead to strong fragmentation in the region. Forced to flee from the conflict area, 
refugees could carry the struggles and tensions with them. They could pose a threat to 
the states that have accepted them because of increased political, economic, social, or 
cultural tensions. In this sense, refugees flows must be treated as a projection of ethnic 
conflict onto the territory of another country “by other means” that increase the 
danger of being drawn into the conflict8. Such extension of the conflict could 
undermine the precarious ethnic balance and compromise and provoke serious 
confrontations in those countries, which consequently would affect the stability and 
security situation in the rest of the Balkan states and would stir up old ethnic and 
nationalist strives. 
 
 
EXTERNAL PRESSURE. 
 
NATO military operation against Serbia has not shaken seriously Milosevic’s power. 
The Yugoslav President has once again revived nationalism and has diverted public 
attention away from Yugoslavia’s domestic problems. So, the threat of a new regional 
conflict still exists and the proximity of the area of potential destabilization as well as 
the possibility that the conflict could spill over directly threatens security of the 
Western countries. Any economic, social and political difficulties (migration and 
refugees, mafias, arms transfers, etc.) in Southeastern Europe would affect the rest of 
the continent. Any destabilization would have a negative effect on the European 
integration process and security9. To reduce those possible negative effects, the 
Western countries have imposed “cordon sanitaire” around Yugoslavia aiming at:  
• preventing the tensions and the waves of instability from spilling over into the 
rest of the continent;  
• increasing political, economic and military pressure over the regime in 
Belgrade in order a peaceful settlement of the conflict to be achieved;  
• overthrowing the Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic and democratization 
of Serbia.  
Aiming at the isolation of Serbia and the containment of the tensions within it, the 
embargo in fact directly affected the peripheral states bringing them significant 
damages in the following aspects:  
Institutional aspect. 
Countries in the region share a fragile institutional system of democracy, which is yet 
to be filled with real substance. The isolation of Yugoslavia, however, indirectly 
hamper their institutional modernization and stabilization. It slows down the 
administrative reforms, the current process of democratization and transformation as a 
whole. The pressure exerted both by Yugoslavia and the international community 
reduce the efficiency of the administrative reform, slow up the decentralization of the 
decision-making process and additionally impede the process of combating 
corruption. On the other side, the weakness of the public institutions seriously 
challenge not only the existing order but also civic security in general. Organized 
crime, illegal economy, large scale corruption and violation of citizens’rights is a 
direct consequence of state institutions’ inability to enforce law and order. 
Economic aspect. 
The war in Kosovo has severely affected the regional economy. The destruction of the 
Danube bridges has not only disrupted Yugoslav Army supply routes but has also 
blockade river trade and has heavily damaged the industries of the Balkan countries. 
Trade between Balkan states now accounts for just 14 per cent of the region’s 
economic activity, and has little chance of increasing10. Furthermore, the international 
community’s embargo on Belgrade has led to the isolation of the economic system of 
the region from the international markets. It has brought about trade isolation, poor 
investment and credit rating of the Balkan countries and has additionally reduced their 
chances as an emerging market to attract investment and to intensify their 
participation in international commerce. Besides, the international sanctions on 
Yugoslavia have slowed down the privatization process in industry and banking as 
well as the reconstruction of the regional infrastructure network that is a basis for the 
economic resurgence of the Balkans. The isolationist approach imposed by the 
international community has undermined the possibilities for regional economic 
cooperation and integration, and the creation of a common regional economic system 
where a key role in economic settlement will not belong to the international financial 
institution but to the countries in the region. 
The Stability Pact has been designed as a long-term strategy to promote economic 
stabilization and integration of the Balkans to the rest of Europe, i.e. to promote the 
main prerequisite for the regional stability and security. So far, this initiative has been 
associated with a bad organization, bureaucratic approach and a lack of coordination 
between the international institutions rather than with any significant results in the 
economic development and reconstruction of the Balkans. The main EU strategy that 
underlies Stability Pact program aims at cutting Serbia out of a growing network of 
cross-border development. Corridor IV, for example, is a large infrastructural project 
that will be the first road and rail link between Greece and Western Europe, which 
does not go through Serbia (till now transport through Yugoslavia was the fastest and 
the cheapest way of getting goods to markets in Central and Western Europe). 
Corridor VIII, an infrastructure area connecting Albania, Bulgaria and Macedonia, 
has just the same aim. In general, all EU plans exclude Serbia from the existing 
development schemes as long as Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic remains in 
power. However, the exclusion of Yugoslavia from the reconstruction process 
additionally brings in question the success of all development and stabilization 
programs. Undoubtedly, an overall process of stabilization, economic reconstruction 
and development of the region cannot be accomplished without the participation of 
Yugoslavia, which has an important geographical location within the infrastructure 
network. 
Security aspect. 
Transforming Yugoslavia into a black hole at the heart of the Balkans, the 
international community has not only made impossible the implementation of real and 
effective regional institutional and economic integration but has also impeded the 
establishment of a stable security order on the Balkans. The imposition of the cordon 
sanitaire as a regional security system model contravenes the very essence of the 
purposes that the international community set a year ago. The isolation of Yugoslavia 
dooms to failure any attempt a higher level of national and regional security to be 
achieved through coordinated foreign policy actions of all the states in the region. It 
deprives of legal base any coordination of the states efforts to solve problems of 
mutual interest and to stabilize the security situation on the Balkans. 
The new regional security system has not succeeded in developing a new type of 
relationships and interstate behavior and in resolving the problems related to 
cooperation and security. It is still impossible for the countries in the region to 
identify and develop a common regional interest, to develop a more stable 
relationship and to increase the level of confidence in order to improve the security 
situation. It seems that the integrity of the national interests of the countries in the 
region developed during the Kosovo crisis has been broken. Even more, some 
inherited or later developed problems reemerged breaking the compromise between 
the different interests and bringing about new stage of misunderstanding and discords. 
The international sanctions have strongly affected the security situation in the region. 
They have boosted the local mafia economics and have supported the corruption 
process among politicians and civil servants. Consequently, the corruption of the 
administrative bodies has allowed crime and smuggling to flourish and is gradually 
converting the region into an area dominated by international criminal structures and 
different interest groups, which are gaining political influence. 
 
 
THE KEY INTERNATIONAL PLAYERS: DISCREPANCY BETWEEN 
REALITY AND STRATEGY. 
 
NATO. A year ago NATO began military campaign in defense of the human rights 
principles but without a clear political program concerning the post-crisis period. 
Hoping that the popular discontent from the damages caused by the NATO attacks 
and the sustained international sanctions will seriously shaken Milosevic’s hold on 
power, the realization of the strategy of the western countries has been closely related 
to Milosevic’s ousting from power and Serbia’s democratization. The preservation of 
the political status quo in FR Yugoslavia has brought to a discrepancy between the 
real situation on the Balkans and the created strategy of the international community 
concerning this situation. In the absence of well-defined strategy, which strongly to 
correspond to the real political, security and economic situation on the Balkans, as 
well as of a good framework for coordination, the international community has 
confronted the difficult issue concerning the application of those purposes that have 
been set before NATO’s operation against Serbia. 
NATO commitment to the development, reconstruction, and the stabilization of the 
Balkan region has been an important instrument in the containment of the strives 
between the regional conflict parties. KFOR force has prevented the spread of the 
conflict and the creation of new flash points on the Balkans that could damage the 
precarious regional balance as well as the European stability as a whole. However, the 
complex mission of carrying out of a long-term peace process also creates some 
concerns which could have serious consequences for NATO’s unity and credibility. 
One year after the deployment of the international forces in Kosovo, NATO seems to 
be placed in a very delicate situation confronting the national interests and aspirations 
of the both conflict parties. On the one side, the Alliance does not stand for the return 
to Serb rule over the province nor it wants to negotiate with Milosevic who still 
retains his ability to influence the developments within the province. On the other 
side, NATO opposes the creation of an independent Albanian state in Kosovo, which 
being inevitably followed by ethnic cleansing against the Serb population, would 
undermine the positions of all NATO member states government and would bring 
advantages to the internal political opposition in those countries. The peacekeeping 
mission is further impeded by the lack of common perception and the split between 
the positions of the United States and those of the EU countries concerning their 
obligations related to the Kosovo problem. The pre-war understanding has obliged the 
United States to finance the war, and Europe - Kosovo’s post-war reconstruction and 
development. Washington has really contributed two thirds of the military operation 
in Kosovo and now is prone to accuse its European allies for not pulling their weight 
in Kosovo especially in terms of the civilian reconstruction and restoring civil 
administration. 
Worrying about the lack of progress in establishing a stable peace in the province and 
being especially sensitive about exposing to risk their troops during the presidential 
election campaign, the United States subsequently placed new restrictions on the 
deployment of US forces around the province (consequently, all but three of the 
Alliance member states present in Kosovo have done the same). Even more, the 
United States are overly determined to hold elections in the province in October, at 
any cost, in order to withdraw their troops as soon as possible11. 
European Union. Although the Kosovo crisis was estimated as a catalyst for the 
growing integrity of Europe in terms of security and defense issues, in the post-crisis 
period the European Union risks once again allowing the United States to take priority 
in what is called European security space. With the persistent contradictions among 
the EU member states concerning the distribution of the financial burden as well as 
the political significance of the Stability Pact and the whole reconstruction process, 
the Western European countries - whose troops make up 80% of KFOR - further 
impede the success of the peacekeeping mission. Besides, the EU inability to define a 
common position on clear strategy and priorities in the Southeastern Europe and on 
the means to realize it could undermine the process of establishment of a common 
European security and defense mechanism that is a guarantor of the stability in the 
region. 
In April, 2000 KFOR has been placed under the direction of the Eurocorps, an 
alliance made up of troops from Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and Spain. 
The new commander of the peacekeeping troops, General Juan Ortuno, has listed the 
protection of minorities and helping the organization of elections as his top priorities. 
This statement as well as the very handover to the Eurocorps involves an increase of 
the importance of the European Union’s contribution to Kosovo budget and security. 
Russia. NATO campaign against Belgrade has also brought about a split between the 
positions of NATO member states and Russia, which had lost a great deal of its 
influence in the region. Being Serbia’s traditional supporter, Russia strongly criticized 
the Alliance’s bombings on it. In the post crisis period Russian government has many 
times expressed its disapproval of the NATO peacekeeping strategy, which according 
to the Russia’s official position, tolerates and is completely in favor of the ethnic 
Albanians and their separatist aspirations. Confirming its strategic interests on the 
Balkans, Russia has insisted to get a more substantive role for the Russians troops in 
KFOR and has even offered its own idea for the settlement of the problems in Kosovo 
emphasizing on the following prerequisite:  
• respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the FR Yugoslavia;  
• negotiations on the status of Kosovo within the framework of FR Yugoslavia;  
• strengthening the border control between FR Yugoslavia and Macedonia and 
between FR Yugoslavia and Albania;  
• guaranteeing the return of refugees and the co-existence of people of different 
nationality and ethnicity.  
Russia’s stand is that Belgrade should play an important role in the process of 
stabilization and development of the Balkan region. In this sense, Russian policy 
firmly opposes the strategy of the Western country related to the post crisis security 
order on the Balkans. Whereas the new regional security system imposed by the West 
is based on the total isolation of Serbia because of the Milosevic’s regime, Russia 
rejects all international sanctions against Serbia and supports the full integration of 
Yugoslavia into the common Balkan reconstruction and development process.  
The existing conflict of interests within the international community additionally 
impede and defer the settlement of the existing disputes between the countries in the 
Balkan region. The difficulties faced by the key international players in adopting 
common positions and implementing their decisions also have repercussions among 
the countries in the region12. The clash between the opposite special political and 
economic interests as well as the disintegration of the international community views 
about the processes in the Southeastern Europe best serves the interests of the 
different conflict groups in the region. Each of these conflict groups consolidates its 
positions, mobilizes its internal forces and tries to gain the favor and the good will of 
some of the great international players in achieving its own particular interest. The 
following intensification of the existing confrontations will make impossible a 
compromise to be worked out and hence, a regional political and economic 
integration as well as a collective security framework to be established.  
CONCLUSION:  
A year ago NATO started a military operation against Serbia in order to put an end to 
mass-scale violation of fundamental human rights, repression and discrimination on 
the basis of ethnicity. After the hot phase of the conflict these actions have not been 
succeeded by an appropriate post-crisis politico-military strategy backed by the 
indispensable unity of the international community. Consequently, the fragile peace in 
Kosovo has done nothing to resolve the long-term issue of Kosovo status, leaving 
both the Serb aim of Yugoslav sovereignty and the KLA’s aim for independence of 
the territory legitimized.  
On the one hand, NATO commitment to the development and stabilization of the 
South-East Europe region has prevented the spill over of the tensions and struggles 
from Kosovo to the rest of the region as well as further destabilization of the 
precarious regional security balance. On the other hand, the complex post-crisis 
mission has turned out to be the more difficult task for the international community 
provoking some confusion between its objectives and policy implemented. Until now, 
the international forces in Kosovo have failed to demonstrate a clear mastery of the 
situation despite its troops and civil administration. They have failed to provide for 
security and reconstruction, to reinstate rule of law and to build an effective law 
enforcement and justice system in the province. Both KFOR forces and the UN police 
contingent have not succeeded neither in preventing armed conflict and ensuring 
public safety and order, nor in deterring and clearing up crime, much of which is 
ethnic in motivation, nor in stopping violence and ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. This 
ineffective authority has allowed a serious power vacuum to develop, which Albanian 
criminal structures closely related to KLA have used to impose their direct rule over 
the territory of the province, to force out most of the Serb and other non-Albanian 
population and to get closer to their supreme aim - independent Albanian Kosovo.  
The new security order imposed on the Balkans after the Kosovo war has been based 
on the full isolation of Belgrade’s regime considered as the main security threat for 
the region. The developments of the regional situation during the last one year, 
however, have proved that the “cordon sanitaire” and the isolation of a conflict area as 
a means for the settlement of problems is counterproductive in short and media term. 
On the first place, it has deprived the international community of any lever and a 
means of control over Belgrade’s regime. On the second place, the embargo against 
Serbia has aggravated the internal economic crisis not only in FRY but equally in 
neighboring countries. It has impeded the development of bilateral relations among 
the countries in the region as well as the establishment of a true Balkan market, which 
further slows down the process of political and economic reconstruction throughout 
the region. On the third place, the non-participation of the state concerned into the 
international decision-making process has undermined the very foundation of 
cooperative security policy. It seems that any attempt to stabilize the Balkans without 
including the country that is at the region’s core is doomed to failure. The desire to 
contain the regime in Belgrade has proved to be incompatible with the general efforts 
to transform the Balkans into a stability and security zone, and to open the region to 
the rest of the world. Therefore, the international community, and especially the 
European Union, has to work out a new strategy for the Balkans underlined by the 
idea that in the security-building process the cooperation of the parties directly 
involved is indispensable and the international community cannot substitute for them. 
THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND CHANGE OF 
BORDERS  
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Introduction 
The expectation for another conflict in the Balkans in the next few months is based on 
the upsurge in Southern Serbia, the doubtful results of the international administration 
in Kosovo and the tensions between Montenegro and Serbia. An outburst in any of 
these vulnerable points would lead to a chain reaction, igniting other hot spots in the 
region.  
All these problems relate to the concept of 'self-determination', which refers to the 
right of all peoples to freely determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development. Basically, this means that a given people 
are recognized this right and thus, the political status of a territory they claim is 
legitimized internationally. Self-determination could be exercised in different forms, 
but the local context and experience implies resort to secession.  
Along these lines the complex problems of the Balkans can be reduced to one 
question. If the principle of self-determination is to be given primacy over the 
principle of 'state sovereignty and territorial integrity', or rather how they will be 
interpreted, where and when will applied:  
• General application of the principle of (national) self-determination would 
mean that the international community would itself establish or accept the 
establishment of new political-territorial units. This would bring about 
'domino effect' in the region, offering the possibility of redrawing existing 
boundaries, reopening of recent conflicts and starting of new ones.  
• Preserving the status quo would avoid open confrontations in the short run, 
but is based on wishful thinking, because it does not offer answers neither to 
the status of Kosovo, the future of Montenegro in FRY, nor to the concrete 
long-term international involvement in the region.  
• Selectively resolving each case, in accordance with the specific conflict 
potential, timing and prospects for sustainable results (this is in fact keeping 
the present behavior). Though past experience has shown this is not part of a 
grand strategy, this option is the most likely to happen, because it offers more 
flexible solutions, coherent with the international community interests and the 
facts on the ground.  
The contradictions between the principles of 'self-determination', including 
international humanitarian intervention' and 'sovereignty of states', including 
territorial integrity for the Balkans does not comprise only a debate on the changing 
character of international law or human rights issue, but has also its serious security 
dimensions. The application of the principle of self-determination in the case of 
Kosovo (i.e. independent Kosovo) would trigger the disintegration of the federation 
between Serbia and Montenegro, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 
Bosnian-Croat Federation, the territorial integrity of Serbia and Montenegro 
themselves, Macedonia, and will affect the rest of the countries in the region.  
Besides the implications of the international normative framework, the issues are 
further complicated by the size and the strength of the local factors and by the 
intentions and controversial results of international factors in their peace-enforcing, 
peace-keeping and state-building efforts.  
 
Regional implications: the logic of 'domino effect'  
The current developments in the regional situation, even at a first glance, suggest that 
if one change occurs in the status of the different political-territorial units, it is likely 
to have grave impact on other subject in the international system in the Balkans.  
Recognizing a distinctive political status of Kosovo (independence), for example 
would trigger the separation between Montenegro and Serbia and a final 
dismemberment of FR Yugoslavia. This would give ground for Republica Srpska to 
claim integration with Serbia, and subsequently make the Bosnian-Croatian 
Federation within the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina meaningless. The Croatian 
population would request union with Croatia, leaving pieces of territory to the 
Bosnian Muslims. In Serbia itself the vulnerable points will erupt--South Serbia with 
its Albanian minority; the Muslims of Sandzac would first seek independence from 
Serbia and Montenegro respectively, unification of the two parts of the region and 
then integration with what is left of Bosnia; Vojvodina would either seek autonomy or 
its Hungarians will join Hungary. If this is the "north-north-west direction" of the next 
Balkan conflict, its "south-south-east" dimensions would ensue from an All-Albanian 
unification aspirations, disintegrating Macedonia and destabilizing Bulgaria and 
Greece. 
Speculating about Balkan future and redrawing its map makes sense only in case 
enough evidence is provided to back up this scenario. For analytical purposes, the 
controversies between the principles of 'self-determination' and 'state sovereignty and 
inviolability of borders' has to be examined, then to distinguish the peculiarities of 
each case in terms of normative framework, actual situation, conflict potential, and 
the role of domestic and external factors.  
The implication of the principle of self-determination in international relations goes 
beyond the Balkan situation. It is not only a legal or human rights issue--its security 
aspects are likely to launch the 'domino effect' all over again, affecting the whole 
region. The balance between the right of people to self-determination (including 
secession) while upholding the principle of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of 
states poses a major challenge for the region in the coming century.  
 
The Principles of Self-determination and State Sovereignty as Legal Issues  
The principle of self-determination was first mentioned as such in Articles 1(2) and 
55 of the UN Charter as a basis for the development of friendly relations between 
states. Subsequently, 'self-determination' described the right of all peoples to `freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development'.13 Along these lines self-determination could be referred to as the right 
of the people to determine freely their political status, ranging from independence, 
union or free association with another state. The importance of the principle is that it 
also relates to territoriality, i.e. it is an international recognition of a distinct status 
granted to a territory.  
The principle of self-determination comes in odds with the commonly accepted 
principle of sovereignty of states, including inviolability of state frontiers, as 
stipulated in the UN Charter and consequent documents, and in the Helsinki Final Act 
of the CSCE.14 The territory of a state is guaranteed by commonly accepted norms, 
which is not yet overridden by 'self-determination' in international relations.  
Resolution 1514 (xv) of 1960, adopted by the UN General Assembly, called 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, also 
tries to accommodate the discrepancies between these two norms. After defining 
(somewhat vaguely) what the right to self-determination is, the Resolution claims 
that:  
Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and 
the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations.  
These developments have attached a colonial context to self-determination, and it 
applied to colonies, dependent and trust territories and not metropolitan states. The 
CSCE principles several years later were adopted in another context--Cold War 
confrontation in Europe and self-determination implied probably for the West the 
possibility of Eastern block peoples to change the political system, while to the East 
the right to maintain that system.  
In the post-Cold War period, with the break up of the Eastern block, self-
determination used to refer not only to secession from a parent state (like USSR and 
SFRY), but also the will of the Eastern nations to change the socialist system to 
liberal democracy. In this regard, the principle of self-determination did not embody a 
legal right, but rather a political will.  
 
The Balkans "Model of Conflict Management"  
Conflict prevention and conflict management in the Balkans has been defined by their 
goals, legalizing norms, mechanisms and instruments of involvement and 
intervention, and has their external (out-of-region) and internal (regional) constraints.  
The global objectives of international intervention have been to end violence and 
secure international peace. This has been justified through humanitarian intervention 
cause because of gross breaches of human rights and threat to international peace. 
International intervention has been carried out by different actors--individual states, 
UN, OSCE, Council of Europe, the European Community (later the European Union), 
NATO, specially designed organs, like the Contact Group, but the principal 
instrument of intervention has been multilateral intervention.  
The external constraints to international involvement in the crises are the different and 
changing interests and resources of the players at the international scene, the 
institutional specifics of the international organizations that have been involved in the 
crises and of course the existing international normative framework concerning the 
crises.  
Ethnic politics, be it ethnic nationalism or ethnonationalism, has the greatest relative 
strength among the internal constraints to conflict resolution (and main "perpetrator"). 
In other words, this is the principle of nationalism which holds that the "national unit 
should be congruent with the political unit"15 - every nation should have its state. So 
"conflict managers" in the Balkans have to balance between ethnic politics, reworded 
in political projects and the acting international normative framework and the other 
external factors.  
Once taken into account, the proposed solutions should be tested against the 
capacities of the executors of proposed solutions on the ground in a long-term 
perspective. This actually means the capacity of states (or state-like entities), 
responsible for hosting institutional solutions to residing conflicts and implementing 
policy arrangements.  
The possible institutional solutions to the conflicts should be able to accommodate the 
consequences of self-determination with international stability, the forms being 
international protectorates, federal or confederate structures, consociational 
arrangements, cantonization, all of them introduced in the environment of democratic 
regimes.  
International response to the recurring Balkan crises has been quite diverse; 
nonetheless there are some constant features, which include emergence of precedents 
of policy decisions, actions and outcomes. Hence, one could claim the evolvement of 
a model, based on "precedent-based reasoning" on behalf of the members of the 
international community, with all the limitations specified above which could outline 
the possible policy options for conflict management in the Balkans.  
 
Perimeters of self-determination  
References to self-determination always call for identification of the beneficiary of 
this right--is it nationally/ethnically defined, or does it apply to a population of a 
given territory, who are claiming this right.  
"The Peoples"  
The current normative framework does not provide enough hints for a clear answer to 
the question: who has the right to self-determination, i.e. how "peoples" is defined? 
This is a paramount question, since social science disciplines have vested efforts, for 
practical reasons, in distinguishing first between 'nation' and 'state', and then between 
different forms of human collectivities such as 'nations', 'ethnic groups' and related 
phenomenon such as ethnicity, ethnie, minorities, nationalism, ethnonationalism, etc.  
In historical perspective, the principle of 'self-government', introduced by President 
Wilson, used to refer to the ethnic groups, constituting the Habsburg and the Ottoman 
empires. In the 1950s and '60s, self-determination was largely applied to colonial 
people. In practice, the newly emerging states were demarcated along the borders of 
former colonies, without taking into account ethnic divides. Thus, most of the post-
colonial states are comprised of different ethnic groups, subsequently competing for 
control of state power or secession.  
In short, international normative framework has failed to indicate the criteria to which 
a given group has the right to pursue legitimately self-determination policies. 
Inevitably, within the still nation-state system of international relations, the groups, 
aspiring to a greater autonomy or independence are usually described as separatists 
and/or ethnonationalists.  
 
Levels of self-determination  
Self-determination, along political regulation of conflict, is a question first of all of 
participation and representation. Moreover, self-determination can be expressed in 
different forms, ranging from different sorts of autonomy to full independence, 
granted to a collectivity of people with distinct territory, i.e. the right to statehood.  
Autonomy itself could be non-territorial and territorial. In cases of non-territorial 
autonomy, also referred to as 'cultural autonomy', power is devolved from the state to 
authorities whose jurisdiction is over individuals defined not in territorial terms but in 
terms of some cultural or subjectively defined characteristic (like the millet system of 
the Ottoman empire).16 In the case of territorial autonomy, rights to self-government 
are attached to a group, inhabiting a particular territory.  
Indeed, any discussion about self-determination calls also for clarifying the issue of 
collective and individual rights. It is not self-evident that collective rights concept and 
self-determination go hand by hand. In international documents, as far as human 
rights are concerned, it is implied that beneficiaries are individuals, members of 
minorities referred to as to "persons belonging to national minorities" and not so 
much to collective rights17. Analysts claim that inter-state system is very important 
when studying secessionist aspirations, i.e. whether the system is permissive or 
restrictive.18 In other words, this includes the question of state policies towards 
minorities and the respective reaction of minorities19 against the state.  
 
Autonomy in the Balkans  
In historical perspective, the particular Balkan experience is indicative that autonomy 
in many cases is in fact effective independence. The dissolution of the Ottoman 
Empire replicates cases of self-determination, leading to territorial autonomy and 
subsequently to full independence. Suffice to mention Serbia, which was granted 
independence only in 1878, or Bulgaria, which proclaimed its independence thirty 
years after the Russian-Turkish war of 1878. Although prior to proclaiming 
independence they were formally autonomous territories within the Ottoman Empire, 
they enjoyed de facto independence.  
More recent case includes the autonomous status of Kosovo, provided by the 1974 
Yugoslav Constitution. Observers claim that the Kosovo, though de jure within the 
confines of Serbia, could not be controlled by the Republican authorities. On the 
opposite, the Kosovo representatives had control over the Republic internal policy 
through their participation in the Republic's assembly.20 Despite formally keeping 
their status, the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina since the late 80s 
has been effectively outstripped from their privileges.21  
If their sovereignty and independence are considered formal basic criteria of different 
territorial-political units in the Balkans, the following groups could be distinguished: 
1) independent states: Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Macedonia, Croatia, Turkey; 2) 
semi-independent: Greece (member of EU), Montenegro, Serbia (members of FRY), 
Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (members of the 
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina). Along unitary-federal state axis, the situation is 
the following--unitary: Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Macedonia, Croatia, Greece and 
Turkey, federal--Yugoslavia and BiH.  
Considerations about the internal structure of a state is important in regard to the 
specific Balkan experience, since federal structures are more prone to dismemberment 
and the successor states are more easily accepted into the international community. 
Hence, autonomous or semi-independent states are more likely to claim secession.  
 
The four principles of legitimizing right to a territory  
Claims for secessionist self-determination inevitably relate to the problem of dividing 
territories. Susan Woodward distinguishes four principles, through which served for 
seeking self-determination in the course of the Yugoslav crisis--'historicist', 
'democratic', 'Helsinki' and 'realist' one (and the fifth one, "introduced" by Radovan 
Karadzic, is based on land ownership).22  
The historicist principle claims a territory through references to pre-existing historical 
state. The difficulty with it is that every group and nation could find a period in its 
history that gives it the legitimate right over a territory.  
The Helsinki principle defines nation-states with their current existing borders and 
views violation of borders as unacceptable. Contesting existing borders is deemed as a 
major threat to peace and international order.  
The "democratic" principle is closer to the general understanding of self-
determination, as it provides for a choice, expressed in a referendum, of the 
population of a territory.  
The realist principle holds that physical control over a territory, whether maintained 
by a legitimate government or achieved by force, determines the state of affairs.  
 
The Yugoslav Experience - 1990-1999  
The disintegration of post-World War II Yugoslavia started with the multi-party 
elections held in 1990, and then the referenda in the Republics in 1990-1991, 
concerning their status within Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia.  
The external (Western European and EC at this stage) response to the starting 
disintegration of Yugoslavia was first a stand on the preservation of the State in the 
then existing form. The EC initiated Hague Conference on Yugoslavia in the 
beginning of September 1991 adopted a difference stance, providing for the 
sovereignty of different republics, which could decide on their relations with the other 
members of the federation - so the projection would be the establishment of a loose 
federation or confederation of states.  
The Arbitration Committee, established by the EC (known also as the Badinter 
Committee) had to assist the EC decisions, regarding the recognition of new East 
European States, and especially those of the SFRY and the USSR.  
Slovenia, followed by Croatia received left the federation in 1991. The third republic 
to emerge from SFRY was Bosnia-Herzegovina, which declared independence on 
Error! Not a valid filename.February 29, 1992 , while Bosnian Serbs proclaimed a 
separate state of Republika Srpska on Error! Not a valid filename.March 27, 1992. 
The Republic of BiH, under its Muslim presidency, was recognized by the European 
Community on Error! Not a valid filename.April 6, 1992. The international 
recognition was extended by the acceptance of Slovenia, Croatia and BiH, when they 
became members of the United Nations on Error! Not a valid filename.May 22, 
1992.  
The West admitted that the Yugoslav population had self-determination rights, but the 
question is to whom and what did it apply. Obviously, it did circumscribe only an 
ethnic majority within existing administrative borders of the republics. Slovenia did 
not have large minorities and was perceived as ethnically homogenous, but Croatia 
had its numerous Serbian majority, concentrated in distinct parts of the territory. The 
vote of this minority to stay within Yugoslavia was not taken into account by the 
international community, neither was the aspiration of the Serbs and Croats in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina.23  
The international responses to the Yugoslav crises since 1990-1991 are indicative for 
changes in the interpretation and proposals for codification of these changes in 
international normative framework. Two basic principles--sovereignty of states and 
inviolability of borders are challenged by commonly accepted international values. 
Observing human rights is a responsibility of the State, but gross infringements on 
human rights are of primary concern of international (UN) and regional organizations 
(OSCE, COE). There are established mechanisms for protection of human rights, 
intervention in state affairs, but the pending question is of the limitations to external 
intervention, its legitimacy and mechanisms. Apart from "conspiracy theories" 
explaining international intervention in the Balkans, the evident reasons for such 
interventions so far are protecting international peace and ceasing human rights 
violations.  
In the beginning of the Yugoslav crises, some actors at the international scene 
(Germany and Austria, followed by the EC) decided to recognize the independence of 
the Yugoslav republics which legitimized international intervention. Recognition 
meant that Article VII provisions of the UN Charter could be activated, stating that 
the activities of the Yugoslav army was an act of aggression and could be used in 
restoring international peace. The legal grounds for intervention in Kosovo several 
years later was validated by human rights concerns.  
Two Interpretations of Self-determination  
The Badinter Committee's treatment of the issue of self-determination results in 
several conclusions. What is implied in the opinions of the Committee is that there are 
two major understandings of 'self-determination'. The first one confers this right to 
republics (not constituent nations in the Yugoslav case), understood as full 
independence, and the second one refers to self-determination as a matter of human 
rights issue, concerning minorities within the (potentially) sovereign states.  
In the first case, these are the Slovene and Croatian appeals for independence on the 
basis of the right of every nation to self-determination. The EC and the Committee de 
facto and de jure admitted this right to the Slovene and the Croatian nations, but 
identified within the existing republican borders. As far as the then functioning 
Constitution of SFRY is concerned, its first Basic Principle said that `the nations of 
Yugoslavia, proceeding from the right of every nation to self-determination, including 
the right of secession...', but no mechanism for secession was identified.  
The second interpretation evolved in relation to the Committee's decision on the 
request about the right of the Serbs, living in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, to 
self-determination on the ground of being one of the constituent peoples of the SFRY. 
The Committee refers to Article 1 of the International Covenants on Human Rights of 
1986 and claims that the right of self-determination refers to safeguarding human 
rights, and especially of the right to identity, and applies to minorities and ethnic 
groups. Therefore, the Serbian population outside Serbia is regarded as a minority, 
whose rights should be protected by the state, i.e. Croatia and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, respectively. Those rights were to be regulated by the existing 
international normative framework and by the draft Convention of the Conference on 
Yugoslavia, held in November 1991. In fact, the Hague Conference tried to raise the 
question of rendering territorial autonomy to the Serbs in Krajna (Croatia) and the 
Albanians in Kosovo, but this suggestion did not came into effect, as there were no 
leverages to influence Serbian and Croat leadership.24  
Territorial Arrangements  
The Committee's decision on the Yugoslav case was motivated by the Mali-Burkina 
Faso case of the International Court of 1986. The answer is based on the perception 
that the principle of inviolability of existing frontiers cannot be ignored, and this is in 
line with the defined uti possidentis.25 The 1986 case stipulates that the pre-existing 
administrative frontiers of the colonies are to be considered the frontiers of the new 
independent states. Any readjustment of the frontiers was deemed as a threat to 
stability and peace, violating the basic principle of territorial integrity of states. The 
International Court had also taken into consideration the conflict between the 
principle of self-determination and that of uti possidetis juris, but concluded that:  
The essential requirement of stability in order to survive, to develop 
and gradually to consolidate their independence in all fields has 
induced African States to consent to the maintenance of colonial 
boundaries or frontiers, and to take account of this when interpreting 
the principle of self-determination of peoples. If the principle of uti 
possidetis has kept its place among the most important legal principles, 
this is by a deliberate choice on the part of African States.  
The Badinter Committee itself noted that: 
Whatever the circumstances, the right to self-determination must not 
involve changes to existing frontiers at the time of independence (uti 
possidetis juris) except where the states concerned agree otherwise.26 
This may be grounded on the 1974 Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, which defined the Republics as `states' (Article 3) and stipulated (in 
Article 5) that the Republic's territories and boundaries cannot be altered without their 
consent. 
Demise of a State, not secessions 
The very opinions of the Badinter Committee (Opinion No.1 - 2) b)) claim that in the 
case of SFRY, the case is not of secession of different republics, but of the 
disintegration of the federation, i.e. it was explicitly stated that SFRY is no longer 
existent. The Committee concluded that the federal institutions were not functioning, 
including the Federal Presidency, the Federal Council, the Council of the Republics 
and the Provinces, the Federal Executive Council, the Constitutional Court or the 
Federal Army, and that they no longer meet the criteria of participation and 
representatives inherent in a federal state. 
International recognition of demise or establishment of a state, as contingent on the 
defining what 'a state' means-- it is commonly defined as a community which consists 
of a territory and a population subject to an organized political authority; that such a 
state is characterized by sovereignty. Apart from these basic criteria, the admission of 
a new state into the international community is done by the members of this 
community through their recognition of the new subject. Judgement for recognition is 
usually conditioned on the prerequisite that the new state will respect international 
law and other obligations. In the case of SFRY, the EC set formal criteria to be met by 
the applicant republics. 
Nonetheless, the criteria, concerning internal affairs are related to two issues: 1) 
control exercised of the government over a territory and 2) legitimacy of the 
government in question in relation to the population. 
Speaking in terms of federal and unitary states, the EC Committee assumed that the 
federation no longer functions and the newly emerged states are unitary ones and the 
governments are the legitimate ones. 
The actual situation was rather different. Ethnic politics on behalf of residing ethnic 
groups contested the legitimacy of the states and the governments, leaving basically 
three options. The first one was keeping the federation intact, expressed by Serb 
minorities in other countries; the second one being gaining territorial autonomy within 
the existing republics; the third option was applying the principle for self-
determination to the fullest, i.e. secession of minority territories from host countries. 
The international community opted for another solution, which was based on 
preserving the republics in their existing borders and securing human rights through 
arrangements as stipulated in basic international documents. 
Case 1: Aggression 
Germany, backed up Austria, which had the guiding role amongst the Western States, 
decided on recognizing the sovereignty of Slovenia and Croatia in the end of 1991 
and urged the other members of the EC to do so in mid-January 1992. Whatever the 
reasons for the German and Austrian behavior were27, the basis of the EC foreign 
policy up to that moment--inviolability of borders and observing the sovereignty of 
SFRY had already changed--after the international recognition of Slovenia and 
Croatia, the administrative borders of the SFRY had become borders of states. Thus, 
the major Helsinki (and international) principle appeared again to protect the borders 
of the newly self-determined states. The grounds for legitimizing international 
intervention in this case were aggression on behalf of the Yugoslav army and 
Yugoslavia. A similar case was that of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
The course of events changed the situation. With the international recognition of the 
former Yugoslav republics, non-recognition of FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) as 
successor of SFRY, the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia became secessionists themselves, 
opposing the internationally acknowledged governments of the two states. 
This approach of the international community could be traced in the UN Security 
Council Resolutions, dating from 1991-1992. Resolution 713 (1991) addressed the 
government of Yugoslavia, Resolution 721 (1991) and Resolution 740 (1992) refers 
to "Yugoslav parties". After the acceptance of the former Yugoslav republics as UN 
member states, they already had all the rights of sovereign members of the 
international community and the protection thereof, as stated in Resolution 787 (1992) 
referring to the threat to the territorial integrity of the state. 
Case 2: Insurgency and Separatism 
Acknowledged as an independent state, equal and sovereign member of the UN, with 
an internationally recognized government, Bosnia and Herzegovina was protected by 
international norms as against aggression by another state (FRY) as well as from 
internal insurgency on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs (and to some extend by Croats). 
The same was true for the new Croatian State, challenged by the federal army and 
after that by the Krajina Serbs. UN Chapter VII principles were reinforced by the EC 
Conference on Yugoslavia, stating that no changes attained by force would be 
acceptable. 
This was definitely cases when self-determination of people, was not in line with the 
intentions, and hence with the particular rules of the international community. The 
Serbs, already defined as a minority or warring party and not a "constituent nation", 
could claim self-determination, the international actors viewed them generally as 
criminals. Nonetheless, Serb atrocities disesteemed their claims and prevented 
acknowledging them the status of belligerent party, fighting for a just cause and 
hence, providing some sort of international legitimacy for their aspirations. 
Case 3: Humanitarian catastrophe 
Serb faction in Bosnia was semi-legalized by including them in the numerous 
negotiations for Bosnia and finally were granted an "entity" within Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, but in any case were not regarded as fighters for freedom. Their actions 
were condemned as crimes against humanity and are dealt with by the UN 
International Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia. 
But what "nationalism studies" paradigm regards as "ethnic nationalism and 
ethonationalism", in terms of international relations and law is quite a different 
matter. 
The Kosova Liberation Army of the Albanians since the start of the armed clashes 
with the Serbian armed forces enjoyed the status of belligerent party, which fought for 
just cause and thus could be regarded as an ally of the democratic West. Though it is 
doubtful to what extend they are really democrats, but self-determination for their 
people was requested and was obtained on the battlefield by NATO forces. 
Although possible as a result of the crisis, the partition of Kosovo was not commented 
officially nor it was set as an option for resolving the crisis. The West would also not 
accept partition of the province between Albanians and Serbia, because it would be a 
sign for yielding to Milosevic's pressure. But there is also the explanation of 
upholding previous course of action, based on avoiding change of borders beyond 
certain extend, moreover, changes achieved by force. 
From a normative point of view Kosovo was the hardest case to be dealt with in terms 
of international intervention, as it was a constituent part of the Republic of Serbia. 
The Ramboullet Accords, proposed in early 1998, were rejected by the Serb side not 
only it provided possibilities for Kosovo's secession, but also it infringed the 
sovereignty of Serbia itself 
The official UN position, expressed in Resolution 1244 provides for: 
Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of the 
international civil presence under which the people of Kosovo can 
enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations. The 
interim administration to provide transitional administration while 
establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic 
self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and 
normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo. 
 
Possible developments 
The Kosovo -- Montenegrin Seesaw 
The complexity of the Balkan case is that there are several different cases, to which 
the principle of self-determination can be applicable, with its own peculiarities. 
Kosovo is undoubtedly the current issue number one in the long list of Balkan 
troubles. Being part of Yugoslavia, the options for its status are--full independence, 
autonomy within Serbia, constituent republic within FRY. Currently, it is an 
international protectorate, governed by UN administration. The document that 
arranges its status internationally is the UN Resolution 1244, and the Military 
Technical Agreement between the International Security Force ("KFOR") and the 
Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia. 
The experience of the Balkans indicates that the international community will not be 
inclined to grant the right to secession self-determination to any entity in the former 
Yugoslav, at least nominally. Kosovo has been provided with an opportunity for self-
government and autonomy but no one has declared the right to secede from FRY or 
Serbia. Neither the Serbs from Kosovo will be allowed secession, the approach being 
some sort of conscosiational arrangement. 
The second republic that constitutes the FR Yugoslavia is Montenegro. According to 
the constitution of FRY, it is a sovereign federal state, founded on the equality of 
citizens and the equality of its member republics. The territory of FRY is a single 
entity comprised by the territories of Serbia and Montenegro, its frontiers are 
inviolable and represents an economic area with a single market.28 
The independent policy led by President Djukanovic, threaten the very existence of 
FR Yugoslavia. For months the Montenegrin authorities has adopted measures that 
would provide for political, economic and financial, military emancipation of the 
state. Those policies, combined with the demonstrated ties with the West and the 
support for the Serbian opposition, risk open confrontation with Milosevic. Besides 
this menace, there are at least several other impediments to Montenegrin 
independence. The republic faces first internal conflict between supporters and 
opponents of rift with Serbia, and consequently it risks itself break-up between the 
Northern and the Southern part of the country. What concerns the international 
environment, the West is not inclined to support independence now as it prefers to 
have "an ally" within FRY and vests its hopes on Djukanovic as unifier of the Serbian 
opposition, and Russian geopolitical purposes will not allow independence either. 
In the regional system Kosovo and Montenegro are in a specific kind of correlation. 
They both held the key of the future of FRY and hence to the regional security 
situation. The interconnectedness of Kosovo and Montenegro is twofold. One of the 
options for arranging the status of Kosovo is to establish the territory as a third, 
constituent republic in the federation. If Montenegro secedes from the union with 
Serbia, this will be the end of FRY and a federation between Serbia and Kosovo is 
virtually impossible. 
Moreover, as a legal issue, it is a matter of the current constitution of FRY, where the 
Federal Assembly has to decide on the alteration of frontiers and the inclusion of 
other republics29 --it is doubtful whether the current Assembly would agree on such 
arrangements. 
On the other hand, international recognition of Kosovo's independence is going to 
further destabilize Serbia and exacerbate the rift within the existing federation. 
The Bosnian Puzzle 
The external borders of BiH had remained unchanged since it was recognized as an 
independent state in 1992, but the internal structure was constituted with the Dayton 
peace treaty o 1995. It is confederate structure with complex relations between the 
two entities and between different levels of government. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is an international quasi-protectorate, which status is 
legitimized by the Dayton Peace Accords.30 The state consists of two entities--the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska, but in fact31 the 
three ethnic groups (or constituent nations) has kept the ethnic divisions intact in the 
institutional make-up of the state. In this regard, the state is like a puzzle, which is put 
in order by the international community and could be easily set apart, contested by the 
different ethnic groups. 
If a process of frontier rearrangements occurs, Republika Srpska would be the first to 
break up and join Serbia, followed by the Croatian entities in the Federation of BiH. 
Sandzak and Vojvodina 
The region of Sandzak has been a concern for policy analysts, deemed as a potential 
spot of conflict. It is inhabited mostly by Muslim population, which has special 
historical and ethnic affiliation with the Bosniaks, and is often regarded and regards 
themselves Bosniaks. The political parties of the Sandzak Muslims are branches of 
the Bosnian Muslims parties, like the Party of Democratic Action. During the war in 
Bosnia and the Kosovo campaign they have suffered limitations of their rights and 
have raised a voice for autonomy and self-rule to the federal government and the 
governments of Serbia and Montenegro. 
The region encompasses a territory, distributed almost evenly between Serbia and 
Montenegro, thus holding the pass between the two Yugoslav republics. The 
importance of this territory to Serbia and Montenegro would be the first obstacle to 
dealing with potential conflict, because neither Serbia nor Montenegro would agree 
upon partition of vital parts of their states. The second impediment is that in the light 
of recent experience, the international community does not have a solid ground for 
supporting self-determination/secession of a territory which did not enjoy previously a 
sort of autonomy. 
Vojvodina is a different case, although it is largely populated by non-Serb population, 
the Hungarians being the most populous minority. The conflict factors have not 
combined in such a manner so to lead to violent clashes. Given the previous 
autonomous status of the Serbian province, comparable to that of Kosovo, it is likely 
that future aspirations of the minorities there will be directed to achieving certain 
benefits from the central authorities. As the conflict is there, but has not reached yet 
the point of no return, there is still time to introduce non-violent conflict management 
strategies, embodied on institutional solutions different from secession or partition. 
Macedonia 
Macedonia is contingent on the delicate balance in present Yugoslavia. The 
deterrence of Kosovo Albanians secession aspiration will provide time for the country 
to manage its own interethnic tensions between the Albanian minority and the 
Macedonian majority. The current leadership of the country includes one of the 
Albanian parties, but it almost sure that more concessions, in terms of representation 
and participation in governance, will be required by the local Albanian community. 
Macedonia should be more adequately supported by the West, and its territorial 
integrity should be explicitly guaranteed. 
Institutional Dimension of Imposing Solutions 
'Weak states', democracy and self-determination 
Self-determination, as a normative idea, is deemed as a predecessor and a counterpart 
of the democratization wave in global perspective. But in fact, self-determination in 
the international normative framework hardly prescribes the establishment of Western 
type of democracy, rather it reiterates the right of "peoples to freely determine" 
whatever political system they would introduce. 
In the Balkans, the West-lead international community, acting through its institutions, 
has been persistent to fill in this gap. It endeavored to impose democratization in self-
determining territories, starting from the EC Conference from 1991 to Dayton and 
Kosovo to the Stability Pact of 1999. Although, strictly speaking, this is in 
contradiction with the UN documents, the conflict resolution strategies in the 
backyard of the Euro-Atlantic space are bound to include 'democracy values'. 
Democratization could be also a viable conflict solution, as it can more easily 
accommodate institutional forms of ethnic conflict management, different from 
secession as the farthest measure to be undertaken. 
Any solution for preventing or managing conflict is to be implemented by some 
authority. In the international system, the primary subjects are states, which bear the 
responsibility to carry out international obligations. In the Balkans, ethnic conflicts 
are as a rule a conflict between a minority and the host-state, though not always the 
case. An important consideration should be the case when the state cannot perform, 
i.e. is a weak state. 
A related term is 'soft-state' with weak or eroded (missing) civic identity, which 
cannot meet the requirement of granting state power through true popular vote. In 
short, this is the strength of a state, its ability to impose regulations, to monitor their 
implementation and if necessary to enforce them. This has been identified as a global 
security threat for the 21st century.32 In case of considerable weakness of the state or 
even lack of state and its institutions, the international community has resorted not 
only to peacekeeping, but also to overall administering of states and territories. They 
have engaged themselves in fact in state-building efforts, trying to establish at least a 
minimum of state infrastructure. 
State-building efforts on behalf of the international community are narrowed down 
not to establishing any sort of self-government, but to democratic regimes. The 
'democratization strategy' seems somewhat taken for granted, after ten years of post-
communist transitions to liberal democracy, when there is hardly anyone in former 
communist countries who upholds the opposite stand. Nationalists of diverse caliber 
are no exception. 
In order to deter conflict resurgence the international community has resorted not only 
to peace-keeping but also to the establishment of dependent states and territories, with 
international administrations with the task to build-up local transition authorities as a 
first step. Subsequently, the steps are to include the granting the right to exercise in 
full self-determination to these 'entities', be it in the form of independence or some 
sort autonomy and self-governance. 
Protectorates and trust territories 
Imposing international administrations bears a resemblance in the Mandate system of 
the League of Nations and the Trusteeship system of the United Nations. After World 
War I the League transferred the colonies of the defeated empires to be ruled by victor 
states. After World War II, the Mandate territories were handled by a specially 
designed organ of the UN--the Trusteeship Council--under the special provisions of 
the UN Chapter. 
Article 76 of the Charter outlined the objectives of the system, saying that it would 
further international peace and security and promote the political, economic, social, 
and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their 
progressive development towards self-government or independence. This system had 
been established to put an end to the colonial system, and just recently finished its 
activities. 
Out of three current UN peacekeeping missions in the Balkans, two has the task to 
actually govern their territories.33 The case of BiH is not so clear, because there it is 
recognized independent state, member of the United Nations. Although there are 
formally acting Constitution and government institutions, the actual decision-making 
is vested to the UN High Representative for Civil Affairs who is the supreme arbiter. 
The Dayton Peace Treaty, Annex 10: Agreement on Civilian Implementation of the 
Peace Settlement, Article V Final Authority to Interpret: "The High Representative is 
the final authority in theater regarding interpretation of this Agreement on the civilian 
implementation of the peace settlement." Even more broad is the UNMIK's (United 
Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo) mandate, introduced by the UN 
Resolution 1244 and the subsequent documents.34 
The comparison to the trusteeship system and protectorates bears negative 
connotations, and is not fitting into the UN regulations. Though, observers describing 
the actual situation commonly refer it to. It is a necessary stage in building security in 
the troubled Balkans. 
The regional implications are that this state of affairs has in fact introduced a 
"protectorate system" in the Balkans, which is dependent on ongoing international 
delivery of humanitarian aid, financial resources, security, etc. There are two 
considerations, ensuing from the present system. The first one is that Bosnia and 
Kosovo are interrelated, as in terms of the prestige of the international community, i.e. 
it has to prove its capacity to achieve its goals, because failure of one of the missions 
will have repercussions in the situation of the other. The second consideration is that 
the behavior of protectorate system affects and will affect the broader regional 
system. The present status of BiH and Kosovo has been determined by the 
international community, but external dependence is restricted in time so they will 
have to "self-determine themselves" sooner or later. 
Security implications 
International post-World War II order has been mastered through the normative 
regulations of the UN charter, especially the principle of territorial sovereignty, 
enshrined in Chapter II, Article 4, stating that: 
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Purposes of the United Nations. 
Challenges to this principle are regarded as threats to international peace and are also 
codified in basic documents of regional organizations such as the Helsinki Principles 
of the OSCE. The global changes occurring in the international system are limiting 
more and more state sovereignty. International intervention, as stipulated in UN 
Chapter VII, is grounded on human rights' violations concerns, related to the right to 
self-determination. 
Self-determination could be called upon when renegotiating the status of the 
underrepresented or oppressed group, be it an ethnic group, nation or a population of a 
territory. This principle, albeit just in its essence, proves to be a serious challenge to 
international order and peace. 
The international community has been challenged several times by recurring Balkan 
crises in terms of balancing between these and related norms through solutions that 
accommodate more or less the claims of all parties involved and at the same time 
avoiding major disturbances in the international order. 
There are several dimensions of the impact of the right to self-determination, posing 
threats to security.35 They are: 
1. spill-over of the conflict or domino effect;  
2. Balkanization, i.e. fragmentation of states into small, hostile units;  
3. "trapped minorities" within newly established entities (i.e. the current situation 
of Serbs in Kosovo);  
4. the danger to a democratic process, challenged by undemocratic minorities, 
aiming disintegration of the given host-state;  
5. the establishment of too small, non-viable entities, which would require 
constant international aid;  
6. recent experience from Kosovo has posed another grave, 'soft-security' threat -
- the fear of establishing de facto of a criminal state, which not only cannot 
control but rather generates criminality.  
The measures undertaken by the international community for managing these 
problems are diverse, and as the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe indents, all-
embracing and integrated set of strategies. However, there are four pillars of the 
conflict management strategy so far: delimiting fragmentation to previously existing 
administrative units, requiring strict human rights regulations, imposing order by 
establishing international protectorates or semi-protectorates. The "last pillar", rather a 
desire, is the basis of all long-term strategies of the West to sustain solutions for the 
Balkans. This is democratization, with a special focus on Serbia. The premise is that a 
democratic Serbia, and any democratic society would match perfectly their goals. 
The problem of this approach is that "democratization of Serbia" is understood as 
"Serbia without Milosevic". No one amongst the "champions of democracy"--the 
Serbian opposition leaders, the Montenegrin government, the former KLA leaders--
has really proved that is adherent of functioning, Western type of democracy. The 
best that has been achieved or would be achieved is introduction of democratic 
institutions and political process, but that will be unlikely to go beyond formal 
procedures, like holding elections and the like. 
Democratization as a grand strategy is sound enough, at least in the long run, but in 
the short and medium term policy actions should be congruent with the objective of 
avoiding the above mentioned security threats. 
• Limiting (or delaying the claims to) the right for self-determination to self-
rule, not to secession and independence, thus  
• Avoiding inducement of similar claims among various minorities, entities, etc. 
and thus  
• Preventing further fragmentation, and change of borders;  
• Requiring, throughout the region, and imposing, in the current international 
protectorates, rule of law and the infrastructure of a 'strong' state.  
An important element of conflict management strategies in this case is timing. The 
international actors should indicate clearly their long-term involvement and 
objectives. It will take several decades for international (NATO) military presence 
and administration to deter and build a long lasting peace in the region. The 
UN/NATO forces in Bosnia have been on the ground for five years already with no 
significant achievements that would guarantee that the state would not fall apart after 
their withdrawal. 
Before providing the right to self-determination, the international community has first 
to make sure that there is an adequate institutional level (infrastructure of a state) 
attained in a given unit, claiming such a right. Otherwise, the international actors will 
face an ongoing process of evolvement of smaller and smaller political units 
("Balkanization" proper), inimical to each other and uncontrollable by international 
norms. The lack of resources to manage these units has only one alternative--to work 
with political units, which has the capacity to carry out adequate policy decisions. 
 
CRIMINALIZATION OF ALBANIAN COMMUNITIES AND REGIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT IN SEE 
Draft May 7, 2000 
Growing mass criminalization of Albanian communities in Albania, Kosovo and 
Macedonia poses a direct threat to regional security and sets serious obstacles to 
regional reconstruction efforts. Albanian mafia groups, organized in typical-Albanian 
social and cultural structures gain more and more power from operating freely in three 
different countries, taking advantage of the weak states of Albania and Macedonia 
and the inability of the international "transitional" administration of Kosovo to 
enforce law and order. The observed mass criminalization of Albanian communities 
and the expansion of organized crime through developing powerful regional networks 
currently hinders the process of reconstruction and development of South Eastern 
Europe and will complicate the future enlargement of the European Union towards 
this end of Europe. 
Decreasing wide spread criminalization in the Balkans should become a main 
objective in implementing reconstruction and development policies for the region. 
There have been considerations for tapping this negative phenomenon, mainly along 
the lines of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, which have not yet produced 
expected results. 
 
1. Social Reorganization of Albanian Communities 
1.1.Migration and Urbanization. 
For the past ten years, Albanians have followed a pattern of mass migration to cities 
looking for better economic opportunities. The crises in Kosovo and blood feuds 
between clans in Albania reinforced the process by destroying rural settlements and 
providing new means for survival, mainly humanitarian aid and involvement in 
intensive trafficking of drugs, arms and people36. Demographic changes in areas 
populated by Albanians and the recent international intervention in Kosovo have 
made it impossible to keep track of the redistribution of Albanians in Albania, 
Macedonia and Kosovo. Most of the movements have been towards small towns, thus 
leading to ruralization of town rather than urbanization of villages. The main reason 
for this process is determined by the fact that excessive accumulation of population in 
cities has raised social and psychological issues of shock adaptation. Combined with 
quests for alternative means for survival, this process have resulted in criminalization 
of large groups of Albanians in Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia. 
The absence of powerful state institutions capable of maintaining legal order and 
applying sanctions led to establishing of Albanian mafia groups, which provide well 
paying jobs for an increasing number of Albanians37 . 
1.2. Crises Of Statehood And Power Vacuum. 
Transition processes and the weakness of state institutions, which followed long 
authoritarian rule, revived Albanian social organization models of extended families 
and clans and medieval power patterns. Well-organized gangs, mainly from North 
Albania took advantage of the weakened Yugoslav grasp on Kosovo and in recent 
years successfully filled the power vacuum. 
In neighboring North Western Macedonia, the government has failed to enforce laws 
and legal order or conduct administrative activities, leaving room for power 
consolidation of ethnic Albanian political parties. Local reports say that in order to 
find jobs ethnic Albanians must hold membership in the Democratic Party of 
Albanians (DPA)38. This party is considered to have the power of decision-making 
and holding quasi-administrative functions in this part of Macedonia and being the 
only entity in control of Macedonia's state borders with Albania and Kosovo. 
One of the major outcomes of the international intervention in Kosovo - the lack of 
government control over state borders, has facilitated the spread of Albanian gangs 
and well-coordinated activity on the territories of three different countries. Albanian 
leaders also take advantage of the absence of the state and its functions in all the 
aforementioned territories and act as a substitute - they organize order, enforce 
customs and rules, organize sanctions and fines, and guide both economic and 
political events. 
1.3. Revival Of The Clan System. 
Albanian mafia is recognized as one of the most powerful drug and arms mafias 
worldwide, primarily due to its clan-like organization, loyal and well integrated 
members. Reports show that such groups have reproduced ancient moral codes and 
ethics (kanun) which ensure the unity of the group and provide for sticking to the 
group interest. A typical act of enforcing the kanun is the blood vendetta, serving as a 
punishment for offending the dignity of a clan member or undermining the authority 
of a leader. A potential target could be any member of the clan whose representative 
did the offense39. The integrity of the clan organization of Albanian communities is 
based upon a specific set of values and expanding networks of family members and 
relatives. The traditional cultural inability to separate rational from emotional choices, 
combined with a number of inbred believes, have made it impossible for a large 
number of Albanians to make the distinction between crime and patriotism. In many 
occasions, such sentiments are abused by chiefs of organized crime groups for 
effective maintenance of the unity of the group and secure incorporation of new 
members. As a result of this internal integrity, Albanian mafia has taken a leading 
position on the international arena in recent years. 
 
2. Albanian Organized Crime 
2.1. The Balkan Route. 
The increasing criminalization of Albanians has reinforced the Albanian gangs' key 
position on the Balkan Route of heroin. The Balkan Route, being a major channel of 
drug trafficking to Western Europe, has developed into a whole infrastructure 
corridor. Along the corridor, there are a number of dispatcher points, local organized 
groups, transportation and drug processing facilities. Official reports recently confirm 
that Albanians have pushed away Turkish gangs in trafficking heroin form the Middle 
East to Western Europe40. They have consolidated their stand in the business by 
linking directly to Georgian and Armenian drug mafia, which generate almost all of 
the traffic of drugs from Asia to Western Europe. Having Albanians as an option, 
Armenians and Georgians have ceased their partnership with Turkish gangs, due to 
historic and cultural feuds. 
2.2. Transborder Expansion. 
The inclusion of more and more Albanians in organized crime is also a result of the 
expansion of Albanian gangs on the "free-of-law" territories of Kosovo, Western 
Macedonia and Albania. The internal growth of Albanian mafia groups and recent 
events in Kossovo contributed to a different redistribution of illegal earnings. In the 
eve of the Kossovo crises, drugs were usually traded for arms, Albanians abroad 
organized serious fundraising activities in Western Europe, US and Australia, and 
some sympathetic governments financially supported the Kosovo liberation 
movement41., UN experts predicted that in 2000 drug crops in Afghanistan will be 
twice higher than 1999, which may lead to mobilization of additional resources for 
trafficking to Western Europe. That may cause additional criminalization among 
Albanians, who are the main players on the Balkan Route42. 
 
3. International Contributions To Criminalization 
3.1. Inability To Enforce Rule Of Law. 
Besides the internal factors stimulating the phenomenon of mass criminalization of 
Albanians, there are certain external factors leading to the same results. Most of these 
come from the international intervention in the Kosovo crises of 1999 and the 
proliferation of semi-protectorates in the Albanian populated areas. 
Contrary to the initial expectations and goals of the intervention, the international 
institutions have failed so far to overcome the chaos in Kosovo. The underlying well-
organized and efficient criminal structures will hamper any outside attempt at 
restoring order and law. The existence of criminalized clan groups will most 
definitely confront the establishment of functioning democratic institutions and viable 
economic policies. 
The international administration of Kosovo has been based upon the cooperation 
between three entities - the United Nations (UN) through the United Nations Mission 
to Kosovo (UNMIK); KFOR (Including NATO and Russian troops) and the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)43 . UNMIK s mission 
is to launch transitional administration and normalize political and economic process, 
KFOR is in charge of preventing armed conflict and guaranteeing general security and 
OSCE is in charge of organizing elections, supporting independent media and durable 
democratic system. 
UNMIK, KFOR and OSCE on many occasions have failed to act in cooperation and 
coordination among themselves, not to mention local entities. The international efforts 
in Kosovo have failed to restore order and apply simple rules for operation. Some of 
the most pressing issues, like issuing of ID documents, which are rare among 
Albanians will be difficult to solve, since the authorized government to do that is in 
Belgrade. The absence of laws, court system, police force and normal political and 
economic development supports the further expansion of Albanian organized crime 
and encourages similar developments in Macedonia. Gangs in fact act under the 
umbrella of the international administration and take advantage of the chaos44. 
3.2. Foreign Aid. 
International humanitarian aid, which among other things have been a driving motive 
for migration of Albanians, is reportedly used as a supplement to immigrant 
remittances and criminal earnings, amounting to income which is more attractive than 
wages from usual economic activities45. Since there is no clear information about the 
number of Albanians in different areas, there are doubts that aid is also 
misappropriated and traded at black markets. It seems that humanitarian aid 
paradoxically is turning into one of the obstacles to normalization of economic 
activities. There is a similar situation in Western Macedonia where a great number of 
people still live primarily on humanitarian aid. 
International institutions have just started to acknowledge that aid money could have a 
demoralizing effect on local level and directly stimulate organized crime46. There are 
many conditions for the positive effect of foreign aid to be easily undermined by 
corruption and ineffectiveness of the domestic institutions and criminalized public 
administration, a direct consequence of malfunctioning states and disintegrating 
societies47. 
 
4. Balkan Reconstruction and Decriminalization 
Programs and policies of the international community for reconstruction and 
development of the Balkan region should consider a number of measures for 
decriminalization of Albanian communities and preventing the spread of the 
phenomena. The international community has offered a plan of measures in this 
respect, as part of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe and several policy 
recommendations developed by the Center for European Policy Studies. 
4.1. Stability Pact Provisions 
Following the Regional Funding Conference in Brussels in late March, it became 
clear that the initial expectations for balanced financial approach within the three 
working tables did not happen. Besides the scarcity of the funds, hardly even reaching 
levels of EUR 2 billion, the donor conference allocated most of the funds to the 
Second Table along infrastructure projects. At the same time, not enough funds were 
allocated to empower procedures and mechanisms for meeting the goal of the First 
and the Third Tables, within whose priorities are fighting corruption and 
criminalization and generally sustaining regional security. All the funds that were 
allocated for Stability Pact projects, given the current institutional framework and 
capabilities of states in the region, will be utilized and appropriated at very low levels. 
The successful implementation of the Stability Pact requires coordinated efforts to 
help local societies refashion states and re-invent democracies. In order to be 
effective, international contributions should be supported by a favorable institutional 
environment. From an institutional point of view, SEE states represent weak 
countries. Their weakness is considered to constitute the major cause of regional 
insecurity and lack of stability48. In order to avoid the long-term projection of this 
negative factor reconstruction efforts should be focused on several issues which hold 
a strategic importance for the region in short and medium terms. 
Alongside Working Table 1 of the Stability Pact special attention and direct support 
should be paid to several components  governance, local democracy and education. 
Supporting sound and good governance is one of the primary objectives in the process 
of decriminalization. In the Balkans, states maintain inefficient institutions, unable or 
unwilling to enforce the rule of law or to implement consistent policies. Levels of tax 
collection are low and institutions are unable to deliver public goods and services. 
Some states are weaker than others, but in all cases it is clear that the state has failed 
to offer security and development. The proliferation of para-military groups and high 
levels of crime and corruption are among the usual results of the dysfunction of public 
institutions. Stability Pact task forces on good governance though should not be 
focused on establishing respect for human rights49 but emphasis should be put on 
rationalizing public administration, promoting transparency and accountability of 
public institutions. Successful efforts in this respect will restrict the mass character of 
criminalization and will provide necessary conditions for fighting the phenomenon. 
Supporting local democracy and education reform initiatives will in to a certain 
extend complimentary to the efforts for establishing good governance. 
The Working Table on Security is essential for the development of effective 
decriminalization measures. Adopting a set of legal instruments for fighting organized 
crime and corruption is of utmost importance, especially for the Western Balkans50. 
The Pact should support a proactive strategy for regional efforts and initiatives in 
fighting organized crime, since the phenomenon is regional than country specific. 
Enhancing the quality and efficiency of the police and judicial systems in the Western 
Balkans is only possible after implementing entire packages of strategic measures for 
state building and consolidation. 
4.2. Customs Union 
Corruption and criminalization - wide spread phenomena in SEE countries -- have 
grown to become major means of conducting politics and doing business. In addition 
to the traditional distorted distribution of internal resources and the draining of 
national economies, a relatively new approach to misusing international goods and 
cash flow generated by international trade has gained ground. Often, customs 
revenues are used as a source of financing not only for organized crime groups but 
also political parties and elites. 
The suggestion for a customs union in the Balkans51 and abolishing tariffs in order to 
reduce organized crime will inevitably decrease on the other hand the cou ntries  
fresh cash revenues. CEPS suggests that the EU should cover the loss of trade tariffs 
(only in trade with the EU) since the accession policies envisions abolition of such 
tariffs in the future for Balkan countries which will join the Union. In the short term, a 
customs union will seriously destabilize the weak states even more, and on the other 
hand organized crime groups might easily try to compensate the loss of such revenue 
through equally illegal means, like burglary, for instance. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
Organized crime and corruption, involving broad sections of the population support 
the growing wave of criminalization. The viability of this process is caused not so 
much by assumptions for state or official support and sponsoring but it is rather a 
result of social and cultural phenomena. Recently a process of great concern is the 
affiliation of organized crime with political structures - typical for the entire area of 
the Balkans. Recently local opposition media in Macedonia alleged DPA and it leader 
Arben Xhafferi to be in charge of 70% of the orgaized crime52. There is a clear 
tendency of participation of governments in the trafficking through the national 
territory, used as a main source of financing. 
It is not very likely that any regional reconstruction initiative will succeed in the 
context of growing criminalization and the steady political regime in Belgrade. 
Recommendation on behalf of the international community for united efforts of 
Balkans states to stop criminalization will not give expected results. So far, the 
international community has failed in its intentions to bring stability and security and 
the individual countries in the region do not have the resources to initiate effective 
regional cooperation. On the other hand, organized crime groups operate in perfect 
regional syndicates, despite of ethnic, religious or cultural differences. 
Criminalization, seen as one of the main obstacles for regional reconstruction and 
development, is targeted by a package of provisions within the Stability Pact, as well 
as by other entities. All the measures and strategies though are rather piecemeal, and 
have received no serious financial support from the donor coountries and 
organizations. Another problem in this respect is the lack of overall vision about 
possible ways of reducing criminalizations. The relatively stable countries in the 
  region form the so called cordone sanitaire  around Former Yugoslavia are in an 
extremely vulnerable situation, serving as a buffer zone. Instead of influencing 
positive developments, these countries face a future of bad economic conditions and 
low standards of living which can only reinforce negative events and expand 
criminalization, political and social stagnation beyond the Albanian-populated areas. 
 
 
 
1. Anton Parvanov, “The Geopolitical Reality in the Balkans After the Dayton 
Agreement: Main Trends and Perspectives”, 1997 
2. IWPR Balkan Crisis Report, №125 
3. IWPR’S Balkan Crisis Report №126 
4. V.I.P. Dayly News Report, December 6, 1999 
5. IWPR Balkan Crisis Report №136, May 2, 2000 
6. Stratfor, “Kosovo: One Year later”, March 3, 2000 
7. IIWPR Balkan Crisis Report №!42, May 23, 2000 
8. Dr. Jacob W. Kipp, Timothy L. Thomas, ”International Ramifications of 
Yugoslavia’s Serial Wars: the Challenge of Ethno-national Conflicts for a Post-Cold 
War, European Order” 
9. Reinhardt Rummel, ”Common Foreign and Security Policy and Conflict 
Prevention” 
10. IWPR Balkan Crisis Report, №136, May 2, 2000 
11. IWPR Balkan Crisis Group Report, №135, April 28, 2000 
12. Sophia Clement, “Conflict Prevention in the Balkans: Case Studies of Kosovo and 
the FYR of Macedonia” (Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, 
Dec. 1997) 
13. UN Resolution Adopted By The General Assembly 1514 (Xv). Declaration on 
the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples of 1960. 
14. CCSE, Helsinki Final Act (1975). 1. (a) Declaration on Principles Guiding 
Relations between Participating States. The ten principles are I. Sovereign equality, 
respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty; II. Refraining from the threat or use of 
force; III. Inviolability of frontiers; IV. Territorial integrity of States; V. Peaceful 
settlement of disputes; VI. Non-intervention in internal affairs; VII. Respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms,including the freedom of thought, 
conscience, religion or belief ; VIII. Equal rights and self-determination of peoples; 
IX. Cooperation among States X. Fulfilment in good faith of obligations under 
international law. Principle VIII. Equal rights and self-determination of peoples says 
that: 
The participating States will respect the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-
determination, acting at all times in conformity with the purposes and principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations and with the relevant norms of international law, 
including those relating to territorial integrity of States. 
By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, all peoples 
always have the right, in full freedom, to determine, when and as they wish, their 
internal and external political status, without external interference, and to pursue as 
they wish their political, economic, social and cultural development. 
The participating States reaffirm the universal significance of respect for and effective 
exercise of equal rights and self-determination of peoples for the development of 
friendly relations among themselves as among all States; they also recall the 
importance of the elimination of any form of violation of this principle. 
15. In Ernest Gellner. Nations and Nationalism. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983. 
16. See John Coakley (1992) “The Resolution of Ethnic Conflict: Towards a 
Typology.” In International Political Science Review (1992), vol. 13, №4. 343-358. 
17. Paris Charter of the OSCE (1990). 
18. John MacGarry and Brendan O'Leary (eds.) "The Macro-political Regulation of 
Ethnic Conflict." In The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Resolution. (Routledge: London-
New York, 1993.) p. 14 
19. Understood here not only in numerical terms, but rather as a group with limited 
access to power, economy, etc. or underrepresented in state governance, 
20. Veljko Vujacic." Institutional Origins of Contemporary Serbian Nationalism." In 
East European Constitutional Review, Vol.5, №4, fall 1996. 
21. Constitution of Serbia . VI Territorial organisation. The autonomous province of 
Vojvodina and the autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohia 
22. Susan Woodward. Balkan Tragedy. (The Brookings Institution: Washington DC, 
1995), pp. 212-213. 
23. See Susan Woodward, Balkan Tragedy. (The Brookings Institution: Washington 
DC, 1995) 
24. Susan Woodward, Balkan Tragedy. (The Brookings Institution: Washington DC, 
1995) 
25. The Chamber cannot disregard the principle of uti possidetis juris, the application 
of which gives rise to this respect for intangibility of frontiers. It is a principle of 
general scope, logically connected with the phenomenon of the obtaining of 
independence, wherever it occurs. Its obvious purpose is to prevent the independence 
and stability of new States being endangered by fratricidal struggles provoked by the 
challenging of frontiers following the withdrawal of the administering power. The fact 
that the new African States have respected the territorial status quo which existed 
when they obtained independence must therefore be seen not as a mere practice but as 
the application in Africa of a rule of general scope which is firmly established in 
matters of decolonization; and the Chamber does not find it necessary to demonstrate 
this for the purposes of the case. 
26. Opinions of the Arbitration Committee. Opinion №2. 
27. Susan Woodward. Balkan Tragedy. (The Brookings Institution: Washington DC, 
1995). 
28. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (April 1992) stipulates in 
Section I, Basic Provisions, Article 1: "The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall be a 
sovereign federal state, founded on the equality of citizens and the equality of its 
member republics." Article 2: "The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall be 
composed of the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Montenegro. The Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia may be joined by other member republics, in accordance with 
the present Constitution." And Article 3: "The territory of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia shall be a single entity comprising the territories of the member republics. 
The frontiers of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall be inviolable. The 
boundaries between member republics may be changed only subject to their 
agreement, in accordance with the constitutions of the member republics." Article 7: 
"Within its competencies, a member republic may maintain relations with foreign 
states, establish its own missions in other states, and join international organizations. 
Within its competencies, a member republic may conclude international agreements, 
but not to the detriment of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or any of its other 
member republics. ; Article 13: "The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall constitute 
a single economic area having a single market." 
29. SECTION V: ORGANS OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA 
1. Article 78: The Federal Assembly shall: 2) decide on admission of other states as 
member republics into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; decide on association with 
other states and on membership in international organizations; 3) decide on alterations 
to the frontiers of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; decide on war and peace; 
declare a state of war, a state of imminent threat of war, and state of emergency. 
30. 1. Continuation. The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the official name of 
which shall henceforth be "Bosnia and Herzegovina," shall continue its legal 
existence under international law as a state, with its internal structure modified as 
provided herein and with its present internationally recognized borders. It shall remain 
a Member State of the United Nations and may as Bosnia and Herzegovina maintain 
or apply for membership in organizations within the United Nations system and other 
international organizations. 3. Composition. Bosnia and Herzegovina shall consist of 
the two Entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska 
(hereinafter "the Entities"). 
31. "[T]oday Bosnia and Herzegovina has three de facto mono-ethnic entities, three 
separate armies, three separate police forces, and a national government that exists 
mostly on paper and operates at the mercy of the entities. political power is 
concentrated largely in the hands of hard line nationalists determined to obstruct 
international efforts to advance the peace process. The effect has been to cement 
wartime ethnic cleansing and maintain ethnic cleansers in power within mono-ethnic 
political frameworks. The few successes of Dayton – the Central Bank, a common 
currency, common license plates, state symbols and customs reforms – are superficial 
and were imposed by the international community. Indeed, the only unqualified 
success has been the four-year absence of armed conflict. Ominously, in the past, 
many local politicians have channelled this unrest into nationalism. 
32. See Gwyn Prins. "Security challenges for the 21st century." NATO Review: 
WEBEDITION, №1 - Jan. 1997, Vol. 45 - pp. 27-30. 
33. The United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP) monitors the 
demilitarization of the Prevlaka peninsula and of the neighbouring areas in Croatia 
and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 
34. On the Authority of the Interim Administration in Kosovo. UNMIK/reg/1999/1; 
25 July 1999; Regulation no. 1999/1 
35. See also Alexis Heraclides, "The International Normative Framework." In The 
Self-determination of Minorities in International Politics. (London: Frank Cass, 1992) 
p.28 
36. Aim Press correspondent in Pristina Fehim Rexhepi noted in an article dated July 
20,1999, that one of the strongest motives for migration of the rural Albanian 
population to towns is the scarcity of foreign aid in villages. 
37. The actual situation in Kosovo in 1999 in terms of order and legality has 
worstened after the withdrawal of Serbian authorities, providing room for 
unsanctioned functioning of mafia groups. Kosovo has been in a similar state even 
before this year due to the inability of Belgrade to tighten control over the province. 
See: Julius Strauss, The Telegraph (UK), September 5, 1999. 
38. Kim Mehmeti. Pyramidal System of Values, AIM Skopje, 17 April, 1997. 
39. The 15th century kanun (code) of Lek Dukagjini, Lord of Dagmo and Zadrima 
regulates revenge killings to preserve the honor of the clan. His intention was to limit 
the cycles of bloodletting among the mountain tribps which sometimes destroyed 
entire communities by enabling a council of tribal elders to arrange a besa, or truce 
once honour had been obtained. or fis has been revived in northern Albania since the 
demise of communism. Enver Hoxha's regime suppressed the kanun but the 
privatisation of land, which reopened ancient disputes, and the breakdown of law and 
order last year, when Albania's armouries were looted, have encouraged direct 
retribution. The code doesn't allow women to be killed, but there have been cases in 
Tropoje [on the Kosovo border], where women have been forced into hiding by death 
threats. See Owen Bowcott, Thousands of Albanian children in hiding to escape blood 
feuds, The Guardian 30th September 1998;. 
40. 1999 Report of the Interpol and the 1999 annual report of the International 
Narcotics Control Board (INCB). 
41. Fund-raising efforts of Kosovars in the United States, as well as those of Albania 
immigrants in Europe, have increased steadily over the past few yesrs. According to 
diplomatic and other observers with experience in the region, the money thus 
assembled has helped the rebels get arms and smuggle them into Kosovo over routes 
through Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro. Supporters of the Kosovo rebels have 
set up a fund, "Home Land Calling," which has a bank account at People's Bank in 
Bridgeport, Conn. KLA supporters in Europe have set up "Home Land Calling" 
accounts in Sweden, Italy, Belgium and Canada. The bank names and account 
numbers are advertised in Albanian newspapers printed in Europe. See: Albanian 
Americans Funding Rebels' Cause by Stacy Sullivan, The Washington Post Tuesday, 
May 26, 1998; 
42. The National Agency for Fighting Organized Crime (NAFOC) reported in 
February, 2000 that illegal drug traffic has undergone a sharp increase over the past 
couple of months. NAFOC chief Gen Kiril Radev said Bulgaria has confiscated 104 
kg of heroin – the amount of all confiscated heroin for 1999, only in two months in 
2000. See press – mvr.bg- 
43. In accordance with RESOLUTION 1244 (1999) asdopted by the UN Security 
Council at its 4011th meeting, on 10 June 1999(see annex 2) 
44. See: Fehim Rexhepi (AIM Pristina), Challenge for KFOR, 20 July 1999. 
45. Here is a very interesting account by an Albanian journalist on the issue:” 
Paradoxically Albania still has the strongest currency in all Eastern Europe. Albanian 
currency "lek" is almost stable and the inflation in levels close to zero, not much due 
to the applied economic policy, than the fact that the country gets $1 million per day 
from the immigrants remittances, of nearly 500,000 immigrants who work in Greece 
and Italy and also considerable amount of hard currency circulate in the country due 
to the illegal traffics of drugs, prostitutes, stolen cars etc. Remzi Lani (AIM-Tirana) 
Albania - Nine Years After. 
46. The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe: From Expectations to Shortcomings, 
IRIS, 2000. 
47. Around the Regional Donors’ Conference of the Stability Pact for South Eastern 
Europe, held in late March, 2000 in Brussels, some EU officials admitted about the 
“demoralizing effect” of foreign aid in some cases when it fuels corruption and 
stimulates organized crime. 
48. Latest reports on the situation in SEE underline the fact that the increased level of 
insecurity in the region is best explained and confronted in terms of the "weak state" – 
see Human Security in Southeast Europe - Special report commissioned by UNDP 
49. Report on the achievements of the Stability Pact – Working Table on 
Democratization and Human Rights, IRIS Papers, April, 2000. 
50. The sub-table on Justice and Home Affairs within the Third Working Table of the 
Stability Pact has suggested to accede to the Council of Europe’s legal instruments, 
mainly the Convention on Laundering, Seizure and Confiscation of Proceeds from 
Crime and the Criminal and Civil Law Conventions on Corruption. IRIS Papers – 
Reports on the Achievements of the Stability Pact, April, 2000. 
51. Gros, Daniel, An Economic System for Post War South Eastern Europe, CEPS 
Paper, June 25, 1999. 
52. Dnevnik Daily in Internet – dnevnik.com.mk/archives 
